[asia-apec 1161] AMPO e-mail bulletin part2

[KOSHIDA Kiyokazu]

 Subject: AMPO: E-mail Bulletin Part2
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/This article is selected from "AMPO: Japan Asia Quarterly Review"Vol.29
No. 1.
The special issue of this volume is 'Taking the Initiative: 
Okinawa's People's Movements Works toward the Future'.

/Contents fo this bulletin
1.On the Trail of a Pair of Fishing Boats: By Jens Wilkinson
2.Article 9: And Now Itユs Gone?: By Douglas Lummis
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Article 9: And Now Itユs Gone?
By Douglas Lummis

Douglas Lummis is a member of AMPOユs editorial board and has long been involved in anti-war movement.

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not recognized.
It was surely one of the greatest collective decisions of the century, and one of the greatest peace initiatives of all time. It defied common sense, flew in the face of the ordinary understanding of international politics, contradicted the very definition of the modern state, and outraged practitioners of  (what they believe to be) realpolitik. Yet for half a century Japanユs メ unrealisticモ Peace Constitution has kept this country from direct participation in any war. Consider the scale of this achievement: a nation whose culture was once believed to be militaristic to the core made a massive decision to turn away from war.1 Since that day no person has been killed or injured under the authority of the right of belligerency of the Japanese state.
Of course, this only applies to direct participation. The Japanese Government gave diplomatic and military support to the U.S. during the Korean, Vietnamese, and Gulf Wars. Under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty there are U.S. bases scattered from Hokkaido to Okinawa (mostly in the latter). And despite language that clearly makes this unconstitutional, the Japanese Government has reestablished a military force called the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and built it up into one of the largest (at least statistically) in the world.
This contradictory situation, which looks to many outsiders like hypocrisy, is in fact the paradoxical result of a long tug-of war between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the general public. The LDP has always wanted to rebuild the military and to amend Article 9, but the public has never permitted this. So the LDP has resorted to a policy of gradualism, starting with a harmless-seeming Police Reserve, and building it up into the present SDF. As a result of this the part of Article 9 that prohibits the maintenance of メland, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potentialモ can be considered dead letter. The same can be said for the renunciation of the メthreat. . . of forceモ (it is meaningless to possess a military force without the implied threat to use it). 
Does this mean that Article 9 itself is destroyed or, as some put it, it is now no more than an メidealモ rather than a binding constitutional provision? The answer at the time of this writing (May 1999) is メnoモ ム but this may change in the next few months or even weeks. If the legislation supporting the new メGuidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,モ which is presently before the Diet, is enacted, that will probably be the deathblow to the Peace Constitution.2

Article 9 before the New Guideline Legislation
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to understand in what way Article 9, though bruised, battered, and badly compromised, still has power today as binding positive law. Under it, the SDF is an utterly anomalous existence ム a body of uniformed men and women organized in military hierarchy, with weapons, military training and discipline, without the legal authority to take military action. The last sentence of Article 9, which denies the state the right of belligerency, is still in effect. The right of belligerency is the essential right of a state to make war: the right of soldiers to kill people and destroy property without being arrested for murder or arson. Government spokesmen argue that the state has an メinherentモ right of self-defense, and so the Japanese state has the right of belligerency no matter what the Constitution says. But as a matter of fact, the SDF has never been provided with rules of engagement ム the rules that specify u!
!
nder what circumstances troops m are willing to sacrifice the lives of their members.
It will be easy to see why the SDF troops sent to Cambodia were kept away from dangerous areas, used primarily for road construction, and sent home as soon as possible.

New Guideline Makes SDF to Military Organization
The メGuidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperationモ, first adopted in 1978, specify how the SDF and the U.S. military will cooperate under the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty. The Guidelines are not a treaty, but an administrative agreement between the two military establishments, and as such do not require legislative approval. But the so-called New Guidelines, adopted in September 1997, specify operations that go far beyond anything provided for in the Security Treaty, or permitted by Japanese law. Put bluntly, they require actions by the SDF that are illegal and unconstitutional. To remedy this the Government is pressing the Legislature to revise the law to make the Guidelines legal. It is a classic case of the tail wagging the dog: the military announces a major change in national policy, and the Legislature obediently cobbles together legislation to make the change legal. Some have compared it to a military coup. 
The New Guidelines do not say that the SDF now has a free hand to join the U.S. in any of its wars. Japanese public opinion would not permit that. What is new in the New Guidelines is that they provide for U.S.-Japanese military cooperation not only in the event of a direct attack on Japan (as provided in the 1978 Guidelines) but also in the event of メsituations in areas surrounding Japan.モ The term メsituationsモ is about as vague as language can get, and the expression メareas surrounding Japanモ is, according to the Guidelines, メnot geographic, but situational.モ That is, no one will say where these メareasモ are ム it depends on the situation. Would メsituationsモ include NATO-type air attacks on North Korea?  Would they include war in the Taiwan straits? Would they include the next Gulf War, if Japanユs oil supplies were threatened? No one will say.
In the event of such a メsituation,モ the New Guidelines do not say that the SDF can leap into battle alongside the U.S. forces. Rather, they provide that メJapan will provide rear area support to those U.S. Forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.モ This rear area support is to be provided not only within Japanese territory, but also メon the high seas and international airspace around Japan, which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.モ
This innocuous language is intended to deceive the Japanese public into believing that their war-renouncing Constitution is not being violated. The SDF will not be engaged in war, they will only be carrying supplies to the U.S. military which is engaged in war, or inspecting ships on the high seas to make sure they are not, for example, carrying supplies to the メenemy.モ On January 27 Foreign Minister Kohmura Masahiko told the Appropriations Committee of the Lower House of the Diet that rear area support メwill not be something that will give the other side the basis in international law for attacking (Japan).モ (Asahi Shimbun, February 17, 1999) But a spokesman for the Defense Agency is quoted as asking, メThe Japanese government says this will not be hostile action, but will the other side think in the same way.モ(ibid)
Of course, no one can say how the other side will think, but the point is that under international law the other side will have every right to attack Japanese forces engaged in rear area support. Whether they actually do so will depend on their strategic decisions. Even merchant ships, when they are carrying military supplies, have been accepted as legitimate military targets in all the wars where they have been used in this century. (Attackers are supposed to give crew members time to save themselves before sinking the ship, but this rule has rarely if ever been followed). The case is even clearer with regard to armed merchant ships: in the Nuremberg Trials German Admirals Doenitz and Raeder were convicted of ordering submarine attacks on neutral and enemy merchant ships without giving warning, but they were acquitted of the charge of attacking armed merchant vessels.
In the case of Japanユs メrear area support,モ the situation will be clearer still. Think of it from the standpoint of the other side. You are being attacked by the U.S. military. Behind the U.S. forces support is being supplied, not by merchant vessels, but by armed naval ships. On those ships are uniformed personnel with military rankings, military training, and the legal authorization from their government to use their weapons. The Japanese Government tells you not to worry, they are non-combatants and you should not attack them. They are ム what? A boy scout troop? A package-delivery team? Uniformed building guards?
The other side will no doubt see them as military forces ム combatants ム and under international law they will have every right to attack them where they can. That means the SDF forces that participate in rear area support must be prepared for this, that is, prepared to fight. 

New Anti-war Movement under the New Article 9
Among the legislation designed to support the New Guidelines is an amendment to the Self Defense Law authorizing the SDF to use their weapons if attacked while giving rear area support. This is where the matter becomes rather surreal. The amendment uses the same language as the Peacekeeping Law, saying that the use of weapons must be based on Article 36 or 37 of the Criminal Code. As I mentioned above, on this legal basis the SDF were not even able to participate fully in peace-keeping operations; what will they do if, in a war situation, they are subjected to military attack? If you are on a ship or in an airplane that is under attack, you cannot use weapons for メindividual self defense.モ If the ship is sunk or the airplane shot down, everyoneユs life is in danger. You must either surrender, or fight back as a unit ム that is, take military action. AInterestingly, as the old Article 9 fades away, a new Article 9 is moving to the center of attention. !
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This is Article 9 of the メ(Oc笊鞜ti闔, wh蜒h 葹s 跂d 蜚s 緕纃蜈s to 癇苺e th癆 蜚 was 鈿t a メdecisionモ at all, but was forced on Japan by a conquering power. But the メdecisionモ can be seen less in the adoption of the Constitution (though this received widespread support at the time) than in the decades-long struggle to support it and to preserve it even after both the U.S. government and Japanユs ruling party turned against it.

2. As it turned out, the change came in a few days. On May 24, just after the draft of this article was submitted to AMPO, the Guideline legislation received final approval by the upper house of the Japanese Diet, the House of Councilors. It is suggested that this article be read as a historical document ム one of the last pieces written on the subject during the era of Japanユs Peace Constitution.  n      
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On the Trail of a Pair of 
Fishing Boats
By Jens Wilkinson

Jens Wilkinson is a translator and rewriting staff for AMPO. He is editing メthe New Observerモ which is the newsletter for foreigners in Japan, analyzing and criticizing a real situation around Japanese Politics.

At the end of March, 1999, an extraordinary event took place off the coast of Japan, in the seas between Japan and the Korean Peninsula. According to official accounts, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces detected the presence of a pair of suspicious foreign ships, disguised as Japanese fishing trawlers, in Japanユs territorial waters. A pursuit ensued, and although the Japanese forces were unable in the end to capture either of the two vessels, it became a major scandal. For reactionary forces, it was a disgrace ム  why were the Japanese forces unable to capture these two ships, which they alleged were from North Korea (and indeed, the charge seems valid). For progressive forces, it represented an important milestone, the first time that Japanese military forces used weapons outside of Japanユs own territory under the Self-Defense Force Law. 
 The facts are clear enough. On the evening of March 23, Japanese forces apparently caught sight of two suspicious vessels, and began a pursuit that was to last for nearly a day. Several Maritime Safety Agency (basically a coast guard) ships began the chase, and later received the assistance of two Maritime Self-Defense ships, which fired repeatedly on the fleeing vessels. In addition, two PC-3 anti-submarine planes dropped bombs in the vicinity of the ships (but not directly on them) in an attempt to halt them. The MSA ships apparently tried a maneuver in which they would ensnare the fleeing vessels in nets, but this tactic was not successful. In the end the two alleged North Korean spy ships escaped in territorial waters of a third country (in this case, Russia), and the chase had to be abandoned. 
For the far right, naturally, this case represented a failure of Japanese メcrisis management,モ in what has become a familiar refrain. Why, they wondered, had the Japanese pursuers let their prey escape, and why indeed was Japanese security so weak that foreign powers sent spy ships into its territorial waters with impunity? To them, this represented all that was wrong with Japanese security policy ム  the hesitation to use force when force was called for. Of course, they failed to ask themselves the question of whether a fleeing ship ム  whether suspected of spying or not ム  was a valid target to destruction, but since the ships escaped (or perhaps were allowed to escape) this became an academic question anyway. They were let free to harp on about another lapse of メcrisis management.モ

Ulterior Motives
One wonders, of course, whether their indignation was righteous or merely a disguise. Several issues stand out which make this pursuit more abnormal that it might appear at first. 
First, critics have pointed out that such incursions are actually quite frequent, almost an everyday event. For whatever reason, there are ships from various countries of the region ム  with North Korea no exception ム  that trawl the Sea of Japan, and presumably sometimes enter into Japanユs territorial waters. They are never pursued, for there is little danger in what they are doing. It appears that there was a deliberate choice by the Japanese government ム  or perhaps the Self-Defense Forces ム  to take this chance and create an incident. 
This may appear odd, but it is not if one considers the timing of the episode. It just so happens that a few days before the メincursion,モ the Japanese National Diet took up deliberations on a remarkable set of laws, which have since been enacted into law, which will give the Self-Defense Forces increased powers, and which will require Japan to provide increased support to the United States forces in case of a メsituation in areas surrounding Japan,モ a code word for a U.S. action against North Korea or, perhaps, China. It seems quite obvious that the incident was carefully selected, that security elites engineered a situation where it would appear that Japanユs defenses were woefully inadequate, and where the new legislation would be necessary to defend the country in our new era of メregional instability.モ   

A History of Events
Intriguingly, this is not the first time that such a breach of Japanユs national interests has been used as a lever to lessen resistance to new militaristic policies. One need not go back to Japanユs incursion into China in the 1930s, where メterroristモ incidents were manufactured to allow Japanese troops to enter, under the pretext of メprotectingモ Japanese lives.
 In more recent years, the MRTA takeover of the Japanese ambassadorユs residence in Peru provided a golden opportunity for proponents of メcrisis managementモ to cry out for a greater ability to project military might abroad. And more recently, during the unrest preceding the resignation of President Suharto in Indonesia, the Japanese government dispatched a squadron of airplanes to メrescue Japanese citizensモ if their lives came in danger. Of course, with the resignation the unrest subsided, and most of the Japanese nationals ended up staying on, so the planes became unnecessary. It was, however, a demonstration by the government that it was prepared to take military action to protect the interests of its citizens. 
It is worthwhile to remember through all this that in recent years ム  through the Gulf War, the subsequent attacks on Iraq, and more recently the NATO war in Yugoslavia ム  the Japanese government has toed the U.S. line, and indeed the boat-chase incident seems engineered as part of a policy of an American-Japanese alliance to promote stability (meaning to protect corporate interests, of course), in the Asian Pacific region, and indeed into faraway places such as the Persian Gulf. 
It seems, unfortunately, that despite Japanユs Article 9, which commits the country to resolving conflicts メwithout the use of military forces,モ the government fundamentally is committed to an opposite course, and the recent moves to amend the Constitution (removing the prohibition against the use of military force) can only be seen as part of an attempt to create what opposition politician Ozawa Ichiro has called a メnormal country,モ meaning essentially a copy of the U.S. model, AWACs, Stealth Bombers, Tomahawks, and all.                n



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The E-mail Bulletin of AMPO
( Vol.29 No.1 Japan Watch and ODA Watch)

/This article is selected from "AMPO: Japan Asia Quarterly Review"Vol.29 No. 1.
The special issue of this volume is 'Taking the Initiative: 
Okinawa's People's Movements Works toward the Future'.

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