[sustran] Something to think about India can't seem to find funding
for good public transpotation
Todd Edelman, Green Idea Factory
edelman at greenidea.eu
Fri Sep 4 03:40:24 JST 2009
Sinking billions into nuclear weapons
Praful Bidwai
Rediff.com, 3 August 2009
http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?act_id=19806
When Ms Gursharan Kaur, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's wife, broke a
coconut on the hull of the INS Arihant amidst the chanting of Vedic
verses, the Indian government took a step towards realising its
post-1998 quest for a grand nuclear weapons power status.
When the submarine is commissioned in a few years, India will have a
'second-strike capability': Even if its land-or air-based nuclear
weapons are destroyed/immobilised, India can still fire a nuclear-tipped
missile at the adversary from the ship, which can stay underwater for
months at a time and is therefore hard to detect.
The Arihant's launch has been called a great achievement of indigenous
technology, which gives 'real teeth' to nuclear deterrence and enhances
India's security without threatening others.
Dr Singh said: 'We do not have any aggressive designs, nor do we seek to
threaten anyone...' But the rationale of nuclear deterrence is based on
inducing terror through mass destruction weapons.
According to that doctrine, you prevent your enemy from nuking you by
threatening 'unacceptable damage' through an attack which instantly
kills hundreds of thousands or millions of civilians. Nuclear deterrence
is a deeply flawed doctrine and was described for half-a-century by
India as morally 'abhorrent' and strategically irrational.
However, what of the claim that the Arihant is an indigenous
technological feat, which shows mastery of 'complex' skills of
compacting the reactor which propels the submarine? In fact, the core of
the Arihant technology lies in the reactor's design and construction.
And that technology came from Russia [ Images ]. Scores of Russian
engineers were sent to India to aid the Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE) and the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO).
It was the Russians who supplied the vital designs, precision equipment
based on their VM-5 reactor, and the technology of miniaturising the
reactor.
At the launch, Dr Singh, Defence Minister A K Antony and Navy chief
Admiral Sureesh Mehta all appreciatively mentioned Russia's
'cooperation' -- a euphemism for virtually building the reactor, fitting
it with high-quality components and providing precision welding inputs.
Present at the function were 143 Russian engineers, designers and
consultants who were crucial participants in the project. So much for
the 'indigenous' technology claim.
In fact, the nuclear submarine project is a long story of failures on
the part of the DAE and DRDO, two of the worst performing departments of
the government, which have never completed a major project on schedule
and without huge cost overruns such as 200 or 500 percent.
The submarine project was sanctioned in 1970 by Indira Gandhi [ Images
]. Then DAE secretary Raja Ramanna's original design of 1975 proved
totally unviable and had to be abandoned after about Rs 100 crores (or
Rs 1 billion in today's terms) was spent on it.
The DAE learnt no lessons from this disaster. Indeed, when a critic with
a reactor engineering doctorate, then navy Captain B K Subba Rao, voiced
his doubts about its design, he was victimised. He was arrested on his
way abroad for an academic conference and charged with espionage -- an
accusation he successfully disproved after long periods in jail.
The project, codenamed Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), was relaunched
in 1975 under the DRDO, helped by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre,
Mumbai [ Images ] and the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research,
Kalpakkam, and a large number of consultants in the public and private
sectors.
This soaked up as much as Rs 2,500 crores (Rs 25 billion) in research
and development (R&D) costs alone within two decades. But the project
failed because the concerned agencies couldn't fabricate high-quality
components and equipment.
In 1987-1988, India decided to try 'reverse engineering' by leasing from
the USSR a Charlie-class nuclear submarine, renamed Chakra, for three
years. This too yielded no worthwhile results in design or fabrication.
The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the lease wasn't renewed.
Finally, in 1998, construction began on the submarine's hull. A
basically Russian-designed compact pressurised-water reactor was
eventually fitted into the hull after nine years.
Meanwhile, the cost meter kept ticking. India has so far spent a
humongous Rs 30,000 crores (Rs 300 billion) on the ATV, with virtually
no side benefits. This equals the entire budget of the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act last year, which generated 45 million person
days of employment. This makes nonsense of rational public-spending
priorities.
But the government is planning to build 10 nuclear submarines. Work on
two has already started. India has also negotiated the lease of yet
another Russian submarine, a hunter-killer type, distinct from the
Arihant, which is a ballistic-missile launcher. The lease will cost
another Rs 350 crores (Rs 3.5 billion) -- although the Navy brass says
it's not keen on the hunter submarine.
However, will the Arihant give India greater security via nuclear
deterrence? Deterrence assumes that nuclear adversaries don't attack
each other because they are fully aware of each other's nuclear
doctrines, want to avert 'unacceptable damage' from retaliation, and
hence will behave rationally at all times. Equally, it assumes there
will be no strategic misperceptions or miscalculations, and no accidents
whatever.
These assumptions don't hold in reality. During the Cold War, there were
countless misperceptions and accidents with counter-strikes being
averted at the last minute. Weather rockets were confused for missiles.
Vessels carrying nuclear weapons collided with one another. The world
was lucky that nukes weren't used. There were 20,000 false alerts which
could have led to instant retaliation -- despite sophisticated command
and control systems on which $6 trillion were spent.
In the India-Pakistan case, no such sophisticated systems exist. There's
a rich history of miscalculation from 1965, 1990, 1999 and 2001-2002 --
when war almost broke out. Indeed, Kargil [ Images ] did happen -- a
mid-sized military conflict with more than 40,000 troops. This falsified
the deterrence premise that nuclear powers don't fight conventional wars.
Clearly, nuclear deterrence is too flawed and unstable a basis on which
to build security. Even old warhorses like Robert McNamara, who recently
died, came to that conclusion. India will go down that very slippery
slope and court disaster while continuing to deprive half its population
of minimum needs.
Yet there's no limit on how much we'll be asked to spend on the military
in the name of the Holy Cow of 'security'. And we're only at the first
stage of acquisition of a large arsenal of nuclear weapons and their
delivery vehicles, including missiles, aircraft and ships of various
description, along with the requisite command and control systems, and
elaborate means to protect so-called nuclear assets, which inevitably
become a liability.
As this column has consistently argued since the Pokharan II blasts of
1998, India's nuclear weapons pursuit is likely to lead to a runaway
increase in arms spending -- over and above rising expenditure on
conventional weapons. Since 1998, military spending has risen threefold
in absolute terms, the highest such increase since Independence.
As India builds up its nuclear arsenal, its adversaries will also try to
match it or retain their superiority.
The real danger is an uncontrolled arms race in which your adversaries,
not you, become the decision maker.
Throughout the Cold War, India rightly warned against the degenerative
and unstable nature of nuclear deterrence and a runaway arms race. It is
repeating that historic folly on a continental scale -- and possibly
beyond, given India's (and China's) ambitious plans to build a
blue-water navy, develop long-range inter-continental ballistic missiles
and acquire 'Star Wars'-style ballistic missile defence systems.
Today, there's virtually no internal or external restraint on military
spending -- witness the 34 per cent spurt in the defence budget in a
single year, which will probably go through Parliament without a debate.
This cannot be justified in the name of fighting terrorism.
You don't need amphibian ships, long-range fighter planes, aircraft
carriers and nuclear-capable missiles to combat terrorism. Yet, so low
is the accountability of the armed services that they can get away with
wild budget increases, which they often don't fully spend.
Nothing illustrates this better than the latest CAG report on the
acquisition of the Russian aircraft-carrier Admiral Gorshkov. This was
first offered in 1994 as a 'free gift' provided India pays for its
refitting and buys jetfighters to be put on it deck. A 'fixed price'
contract was signed for $974 million. The ship was to be delivered
refurbished by August 2008.
Soon, Russia demanded an additional $1.2 billion and pushed the delivery
date to December 2012. But last year, Russia further raised the bill
dramatically to $2.9 billion. India is now negotiating hard, but it's
unlikely that the price tag will be under $2.5 billion. Besides, the
ship won't even have a 'close-in' weapons system until 2017.
According to the CAG report, the supreme, if ugly, irony is that the
'Navy is acquiring a second-hand refitted carrier that has half the
lifespan and is 60 percent more expensive than a new one.'
A CAG official describes the Gorshkov deal as 'the biggest defence
mess-up' ever.
The Gorshkov case isn't unique. Other major arms deals, including the
French Scorpene submarine (price tag, Rs 18,701 crores/Rs 187.01
billion) and British advanced jet-trainer (cost, Rs 8,120 crores/Rs
81.20 billion), are also marked by allegations of undue favours, huge
kickbacks, and dilution of warranty and performance norms. This only
underscores the need for greater accountability on the defence services'
part and for strict Parliamentary oversight of military contracts.
Rediff.com
<http://news.rediff.com/column/2009/aug/03/sinking-billions-into-nuclear-weapons.htm>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Praful Bidwai, a fellow of the Transnational Institute, is a senior
Indian journalist, political activist and widely published commentator.
He is a co-author (with Achin Vanaik) of New Nukes: India, Pakistan and
Global Nuclear Disarmament
<http://www.tni.org/detail_pub.phtml?&know_id=187>.
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