[sustran] Public transport type and ownership

[Kerry Wood]

Greetings

Surely the 'bus bashers' and the 'rail bashers' have both got it wrong:
Public transport can be on either road or rail, and in either case can be
shared with road traffic or on a separate easement. I don't know of any
comprehensive system that is only rail-based, and Vuchic (Vukan R Vuchic
1981, 'Urban Public Transportation - Systems and Technology', Prentice
Hall) has shown that cities with rail-based systems tend to have more
pasengers ON THE BUSES than bus-only syustems.

What does matter is that a good urban public transport system is:

-  Affordable: both capital and fares
-  Fast enough and of good enough quality to be competitive with car use,
at least at the margin.
-  With sufficient capacity to handle demand, without delay and in
reasonable comfort (which does not mean seats for all at peak hours).
-  Part of a comprehensive system, with planned interchanges, integrated
timetables (or short enough waits for integration to be unnecessary), and
through ticketing.
-  Allowed to compete with cars, with enough investment to meet these
requirements and - for a surface system - enough priority to keep to time.
-  What have I missed?

Similarly the ownership doesn't matter too much, so long as the system
meets the above requirements.I find it helpful to think of ownership in
these terms:

-  A privatised system is probably best if there is a functioning market.
-  A publicly owned system is likely to be best if there are too many
market failures, although a carefully designed public/private mix may well
be helpful.

I believe that there are two markets in urban passenger transport, and it
is important to be clear which is which, and what market failures are
present:

Passenger transport market

The players in the passenger transport market fall into four groups:
-  Subsidised car users
-  Heavily subsidised company car users
-  Public transport users, many or most of them subsidised to a variable extent
-  Unsubsidised cyclists and pedestrians

There are several market failures, mainly because of untargeted and
frequently hidden subsidies. Another failure is space allocation: VBZ in
Zurich point out that one tram carries the passenger equivalent of cars in
a traffic jam 2 lanes wide and a kilometre long; they have drawn the right
conclusion but most cities haven't.

Public transport provision market

This is a part of the passenger transport market but it is often treated as
entirely separate.
If the public transport market is regulated, there will be market failures
and they may lead to inefficiencies, but the players (or player) have the
long-term security needed for major investment and the integration needed
to compete in the Pasenger transport market. Market failures can be
minimised by:
-  Letting operating contracts
-  Comparing the performance of different operators, not necessarily in the
same city, using indicators such as cost per seat km offered.
-  Setting up a system to encourage cooperation between operators in
providing a total service.
A question: Where is a good source of information on the European
Vehkehrsverbunds?

If the Public transport provision market is deregulated there may still be
market failures (single operator or agreements to limit competition), or
the market may work well and provide true competition.
However, if the Public transport market works well (a minimum of 6 - 8
operators competing on the main routes), failure to compete in the
Passenger transport market is inevitable: Multiple tickets needed for
journeys on more than one route; little or no service on unprofitable
routes or at unprofitable times; no integration; buses delaying each other
at peak times; and increased costs. A 'successful' market is carrying only
those who have no other choice.


Geoff Kenworthy and others have established total transport costs for
several cities. A selection is:

Bruxelles       4.3 % of Gross Regional Product
Zurich          4.7 %
Sydney          5.9 %
Perth           6.7 %
Los Angeles     7.1 %
Houston         8.2 %
Manila          10.4 %

(Sorry, more Asia-Pacific cities in the report but I don't have a copy with
me).

Zurich, with a totally regulated passenger transport system, has almost the
lowest costs.

A theoretical rationale for the Zurich model is described by Mogridge, with
supporting evidence from a study of London. He has shown that the speed of
motor vehicle travel in central London is closely related to the speed of
public transport. In an editorial in the same issue of Transport Policy,
Goodwin draws attention to the fact that traffic flow is unstable yet
seldom comes to a complete standstill, even with major road closures.
The implication of these observations are profound:

-  Significant numbers of passengers will transfer between private and
public transport to obtain the best advantage: private and public transport
are in the same market.
-  Transport demand is much less rigid than is usually supposed, and
significant numbers of transport users can vary their journey times, routes
or modes to avoid known problems.
-  Publicising the traffic chaos expected from a road closure usually has
the effect of avoiding traffic problems.

Mogridge points out that motor vehicle operating costs rise as vehicle
numbers increase but public transport costs fall as passenger numbers
increase. The problems of rising costs due to too many buses can be avoided
by using larger buses, multiple routes, light rail or heavy rail.

Mogridge gives a generalised curve of costs, with modal split on the x axis
and costs on the y axis. Car costs are low on the left hand side (low car
use) but rise increasingly rapidly as car numbers increase. The curve goes
off the y scale before reaching 100 % car use. Public transport costs are
high on the right hand side (low PT use) and fall towards the left hand
side (increasing PT share), but are higher than the lowest car costs (or is
that higher than perceived car costs?)

The key point is that public transport and cars are competitive at the
margin, so the actual operating point is where the two curves cross and
costs are equal.

Road improvements reduce car costs because of faster travel on the new
road. As a result, public transport costs rise because of passengers lost
to faster travel by car, and perhaps also because of additional delays due
to the new road. Such delays may originate from a more roundabout route,
greater difficulty in re-entering faster traffic streams after a stop, or
consistently missing traffic signals set to give non-stopping vehicles a
'green wave'. However, lower travel times by car bring more cars onto the
road, and higher public transport costs and lower demand move the
equilibrium point upwards. Both effects raise costs: the 'improvements'
have made everybody worse off.

The other approach is to improve public transport, making trains or buses
faster or building a new facility such as a busway or light rail. Public
transport costs fall because the route is faster and so attracts more
passengers. Private car costs may be unchanged if there is plenty of road
space available or the improvement is to a rail line, or may rise if shared
road space is dedicated to public transport, for example in the form of bus
lanes or bus priority at traffic signals. However, the lower costs of
public transport mean that the overall balance between public and private
transport falls, so costs are lower for ALL transport users. The
improvements have been a success.

Commercial traffic flow is largely independent of public transport
provision but commercial traffic speed is much the same as as for other
motor vehicles. Improving public transport speeds up all traffic and so
benefits commercial traffic too.

And fianlly another question: What cities have looked at cheap light rail?
Cut out all the fancy paving and fountains and use locally rebuilt
second-hand vehicles. Even low floor is possible in short sections.


References

Kenworthy, J; Laube, F; Newman, P; Barter, P; 1997  Indicators of transport
efficiency in 37 global cities,  Murdoch University, ISBN 86905-557-715
(Report for World Bank)
Mogridge, MJH (1997), The self-defeating nature of urban road capacity
policy,  Transport Policy 4(1) ISSN 0967-070X


Kerry Wood
Transport Consultant
Phone/fax + 64 4 801 5549  e-mail kwood at central.co.nz
1 McFarlane St  Wellington 6001  New Zealand