[sustran] trans-israel highway

[Paul Barter]

Here is the follow-up message which Todd promised. It explores some wider
implications of toll roads for the potential for Automobile Dependency.
Again it is highly relevant to this region.

>From: litman at IslandNet.com (Todd Litman)
>Date: Wed, 13 Aug 1997 13:42:39 -0700 (PDT)
>Subject: Toll Roads and Automobile Dependency
>
>As described in a previous posting, the Israeli government is planning to
>build a major tolled highway while doing little to provide travel
>alternatives. At first I assumed that this omission was incidental, but upon
>reflection I now suspect that this is intentional, since the toll road's
>financial success depends on high levels of demand. The emphasis on cost
>recovery for new roads creates an incentive to maximize automobile
>dependency. As soon as the government commits to this highway project, any
>alternatives, such as high quality rail or bus transit, will be perceived as
>a threat.
>
>I wonder if this problem is likely to become widespread, particularly in
>developing countries. Political leaders and transportation professionals
>throughout the world tend to favor automobile oriented transportation
>projects, since they themselves tend to be drivers and automobiles are
>considered prestigious. Now that there is so much emphasis on privatization
>and cost recovery for new highways, decision makers are likely to favor
>automobile dependency in order to maximize project revenue.
>
>This prospect is disturbing; residents are denied travel choices and
>encouraged or forced to become more automobile dependent than they would
>choose in a free market simply to satisfy short-term revenue objectives for
>a few projects. As discussed in a recent World Bank study (Jeff Kenworthy,
>Felix Laube, Peter Newman and Paul Barter, Indicators of Transport
>Efficiency in 37 Global Cities, Sustainable Transport Research Group,
>Murdoch University [Perth], for the World Bank [Washington DC], February
>1997.), it is probably also damaging to national economic development in
>such countries.
>
>I would suggest the following policies to avoid this perverse incentive:
>
>1. Governments should not guarantee highway project revenue. Private firms
>that build tolled highways should bear the risk, not the governments that
>oversee overall transportation policy. (In the study by Yaakov Garb I
>described in the previous posting, the author found that in practice most
>privately funded highways in fact have government guarantees, and that this
>tends to result in overbuilding and other careless financial practices.)
>
>2. Tolling should not be used simply for cost recovery of new highways, but
>should be also be applied to existing roadways to manage congestion. The
>emphasis on cost recovery appears to create an incentive for new highways as
>opposed to more efficient management of existing capacity. When congestion
>management is the objective for tolls, then the transportation agency will
>perceive an incentive to encourage alternatives such as transit along the
>corridor. When revenue maximization is the objective, the transportation
>agency will perceive an incentive to keep drivers captive.
>
>3. Highways must always be evaluated as part of an overall transportation
>system, not simply as individual links. Disbenefits to other modes or other
>links must always be considered.
>
>
>Please let me know if you have any comments or further evidence to support
>or refute the tendency of tolled roads to create an incentive for public
>policies that encourage increased automobile dependency in order to maximize
>toll revenue.
>
>
>Sincerely,
>
>Todd Litman, Director
>Victoria Transport Policy Institute
>"Efficiency - Equity - Clarity"
>1250 Rudlin Street
>Victoria, BC, V8V 3R7, Canada
>Phone & Fax: (250) 360-1560
>E-mail:     litman at islandnet.com
>Website:    http://www.islandnet.com/~litman