From gattwd at corso.ch.planet.gen.nz Mon Feb 3 12:54:37 1997 From: gattwd at corso.ch.planet.gen.nz (Gatt Watchdog) Date: Mon, 03 Feb 1997 15:54:37 +1200 Subject: [asia-apec 348] Re: APEC 96: Rhetoric, Reality and Ramos In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Path: corso!gattwd From: gattwd@corso.ch.planet.gen.nz (Gatt Watchdog) Newsgroups: misc.activism.progressive Subject: APEC 96: Rhetoric, Reality and Ramos Message-ID: Date: Mon, 03 Feb 97 15:31:03 +1200 Reply-To: gattwd@corso.ch.planet.gen.nz (Gatt Watchdog) Organization: PlaNet Gaia Otautahi APEC 96: Rhetoric, Reality and Ramos by Aziz Choudry (Adapted from The Big Picture, December 1996) The roadside from Ninoy Aquino International Airport into Manila was still being painted white just days before November's APEC Leaders Summit was held at the former US naval base in Subic preceded by numerous meetings in Manila itself. The paintjob was nothing compared to the tens of thousands of urban poor forcibly removed from the route between the airport and the Philippines International Convention Centre, tthe venue for the officials and trade ministers meetings. The squatter colonies in which they lived were demolished and billboards erected to hide the evidence of the impact of the market-driven, people-last model of development for which APEC acts as a vehicle in the Asia Pacific. A similar model had been embraced with gusto in Ramos' great plan for rapid growth for the Philippines, Philippines 2000. This is based on export-oriented industrialisation, liberalisation of external trade and investment, and deregulation and privatisation. In two words: structural adjustment. The moral of the story is: when the reality of the effects of structural adjustment policies and free market reforms does not stack up with all the rhetoric sweep it under the carpet. But the veneer of stability and economic success which President Ramos sought to project internationally had already slipped by the time APEC hit the Philippines. Try as they might, the Philippine government could not prevent the largest mass mobilisation against APEC so far from taking place, involving thousands of people. According to former Marcos Defence Chief and current Senator J Ponce Enrile, APEC was the "most important event ever to be held in our country, and is many times bigger than the IMF-World Bank Meeting in 1975, the Thrilla in Manila between Muhammed Ali and Joe Frazier also in 1975 and the Miss Universe Beauty Pageants." Not unlike successive New Zealand governments, the Philippines government sees itself as a trailblazer in pursuing policies of unilateral liberalisation, whether or not its neighbours follow. In this sense, its position in APEC is far closer ideologically to the USA than other ASEAN nations. Ridiculous Claims Some truly ridiculous claims were being made of APEC. Ramos said that civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had played a role in shaping the Philippine Individual Action Plan, and indeed the direction of APEC itself. "Sustainable development is the bottom line in APEC, not profits", he claimed, promising a "kinder, gentler APEC". Sure, he met with some NGOs who set up an 'alternative' forum called APSUD (Asia Pacific Sustainable Development Initiative), which played footsie with the government, and got excited at the inclusion of words and phrases like 'sustainable development' in the Philippine IAP. And he'd met with the Ken Douglas-led International Confederation of Free Trade Unions' Asia Pacific Labour Network, who praised globalisation and APEC, but respectfully asked for a seat at APEC on the same basis as business in order to advise on how to address some of the negative impacts of free trade like poor working conditions and union rights. The prominence of such claims shows how effective opposition to APEC has been - these statements were clearly aimed at a Filipino audience in a feeble attempt to counter the widespread unease and outright opposition directed at the APEC meetings. Nothing in the Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA), the detailed blueprint for further action which the meetings endorsed backed up the claims that civil society was now involved in APEC. It merely represented a continuation of the same agenda. Tiresome "Tiger" Talk With the creation of the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), business became a formal adjunct to APEC. In 1996 big business featured much more visibly at the APEC Business Forum (ABF), a two-day summit where hundreds of CEOs from major corporations met to put their own proposals to the APEC meeting, and to lobby ministers from the 18 member 'economies'. At about the same time as Ramos told APSUD how clean and green APEC really was, he addressed the ABF as "my fellow tigers", saying "Let's go for it. Go. Go. Go. Go. Go." Whatever the "it" was it sure as hell was not genuine sustainable development, and the tigers he was talking to were rapidly destroying the environment in which they roamed around looking for new prey - cheaper labour, open economies to plunder, and natural resources to expand their markets and profit margins. Business, Ramos said, was now being engaged as a "full partner" of APEC - rather ironic, given the key role it has always played in driving APEC. Sure enough, with US pressure on to achieve tariff-free trade in information technology products, the infotech corporate barons were out in force at the ABF. People like George David, President of the US-ASEAN Business Council and CEO of Unitech, the 30th largest corporation in the USA with revenues of almost US $23 billion in 1995. Behind all the rhetoric was a country in the grips of a World Bank/IMF-driven programme of structural adjustment and a government hellbent on attracting investment at any price - particularly to the new economic areas of Subic Bay and Olongapo. Manila and the road to Subic were lit up like a Christmas tree, with streetlights draped with banners declaring "APEC Means Business". Nauseatingly regular TV ads announced: "Global Trade: Let's Get Ready". And while the Philippines government tried to make the most of its more unassuming approach to APEC compared with the 1995 summit in Osaka, vast amounts of money were lavished on the meeting. One figure put the government's contribution at P987 million (about NZ $56.1 million) with P140 million (about NZ $ 8 million) from the private sector. Suffering Intensified - Repression Grows The massive dislocation and suffering which followed the eruption of Mt Pinatubo was added to by heavy militarisation and human rights violations in Central Luzon. Nine military battalions were deployed all over Zambales, Bataan and Pampanga in preparation for APEC. East Timor's Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta had been denied a visa to attend the Manila People's Forum on APEC (MPFA) to placate Indonesia - fast becoming a major investor in the Philippines. Others wondered if our names were on a supposed "black list" of suspected "trouble makers" which the Ramos administration claimed it would not allow into the country. As far as the Ramos administration went, any critical attitude towards APEC now constituted "terrorism". 5 Sri Lankan workers and unionists on their way to the MPFA were detained at the airport and sent back a week before the official meetings got underway. In a fax to the MPFA organisers, the Sri Lankans stated "this is the globalisation the APEC leaders are going to impose on us. This is the type of democracy they want to establish". The security measures and elaborate preparations devised for APEC led many Filipinos to ask if this was the excuse that Ramos needed to impose Marcos-style martial law on a large chunk of the country. By the time the official meetings kicked off in Manila, local citizens had been added to the list of "unsightly images" which the government did not want delegates to see, as an enforced four day holiday began, part of the security paranoia which was one of the salient features of APEC 1996. There were bomb scares, tales of "Pakistani-trained" Filipino assassins running around on the southern island of Basilan, and even a couple of drunk American businessmen arrested in Subic on suspicion of being "Jordanians". Labour leader "Popoy" Lagman was arrested by military intelligence before the APEC meetings in a flimsily disguised attempt to get him out of the way before the official meetings. In and around Subic, farmers were told that after November they could not go to their farms to harvest their produce for "security reasons". For the APEC meeting, the Subic area became a virtual fortress. The Philippines government was desperate to be seen as no longer the "sick man of Asia" but a "tiger economy". Road widening schemes were being rushed to completion, and the friendship lanes (two lanes of traffic each way on Manila's main routes were reserved only for APEC delegates) aroused much indignation from Manila's trafficjammed citizens, as well as causing several fatal accidents. While Manila's urban poor watched the bulldozers destroy their squats, 18 luxurious Mediterranean-style (one per "economic leader") were constructed especially for the event at a cost of US $50 million - for about 6 hours use by the leaders. >From Vision To Action - Or Photo-Op? What emerged from this year's APEC Summit, apart from more inane photo-ops of the 18 APEC "economic leaders" lined up and waving, this time wearing barong-tagalogs? Some observers viewed Manila as being the crunch time to see whether APEC's vision would lead to concrete actions by the year 2020. They also pointed out that pressure to move further and faster may well lead to increased tensions between those, especially the "Anglo-American" bloc, eager for decisive progress to be made in terms of liberalisation, and the more cautious, pragmatic approach of many of the Asian countries. This year Ramos insisted that the forum had moved "from vision to action", but again, deliberately ambiguous language glossed over the divisions that are so much a part of APEC. Many offers - for example those of the USA, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand - were vague and patchy. New Zealand representatives expressed disappointment at this. In 1995, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) officials said that they were off to Osaka to eliminate the "wriggle room"; APEC, they said then, was a voluntary agreement insofar as it was voluntary to enter into, but once a member, an economy is bound by its commitments. This view was consistent with the push by the USA and Australia to make APEC a more rules-based beast, rather than a "voluntary, non-binding process". In 1996, MFAT told a different story, seemingly designed to deflect questions about the secrecy surrounding the New Zealand IAP, and the mandate of those representing New Zealand at APEC to make any commitments, especially with a caretaker government in place at the time. Now they said that commitments at APEC were not binding, and that a future government could alter its offer to liberalise. But the goal of free trade by 2010/2020 remained, of course, and this change seemed merely to say that there was some flexibility in the pace and means by which the goal is pursued. In Subic at least, moves to institutionalise APEC did not win out. Japan remained ambiguous in its position on further liberalisation. At Osaka it sought to deflect emphasis on liberalisation with its own push for "technical cooperation". In 1996 it maintained a strong position on this area - naturally enough, such "cooperation" is driven by the interests of its own private sector in securing new opportunities. Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen also stated that APEC should work more towards building economic and technical cooperation among the members. IT Moves At Osaka, the issue of agricultural liberalisation was under the spotlight. A year on, it barely rated a mention. The WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore was not far away, and this certainly shaped the 1996 APEC Summit. Washington's push for an Information Technology agreement to remove tariffs on computers and software by 2000 dominated the meetings. Chile, China, Malaysia and Thailand were not supportive of the proposal. The final wording read that the APEC leaders called for the conclusion of such an agreement by the WTO ministerial conference in Singapore that would "substantially eliminate tariffs by the year 2000" while recognising the need for "flexibility" in negotiations currently underway in Geneva. Disagreement over the pace of liberalisation in this area, and the range of goods included ensured that the USA could not get a consensus in favour of their IT plan. APEC members agreed to harmonise tariff categories by the end of 1996. A target of 1998 was set for harmonising custom clearance procedures. The Leaders Statement supported the ABAC recommendations to create an APEC Business Visa to facilitate the movement of businesspeople within the region, to strengthen investment protection in terms of "transparency, predictability, arbitration and enforcement of contracts", to involve the private sector in infrastructure planning, to develop policies supportive of small and medium enterprises, and encourage greater business sector participation in economic and technical cooperation. The issue of new members was unresolved. Criteria for APEC membership will be decided on in Vancouver in November this year, a list of countries that fit the criteria (Vietnam and Peru seem the most likely contenders) set in 1998, and members would not actually take their places at APEC till it meets in Auckland in 1999. In order to join, a country must voluntarily open up its economy and implement the same sort of programmes as contained in the IAPs of APEC members - a "shadow" IAP, as it were. This resembles the way in which countries seeking World Bank loans must first implement shadow structural adjustment programmes to prove that they can follow the dictates of the World Bank conditions. Nationwide Opposition Mounted While its government engaged in "all-out liberalisation", as Congressman Wigberto Tanada put it, many Filipinos were actively opposing APEC, seeing very clearly how it meshed with the policies imposed in the name of "Philippines 2000" by Ramos, or IMF-World Bank structural adjustment programmes. People mobilised against APEC not only in Manila, but in Cebu, Subic, Iloilo, Bacolod City, Davao and elsewhere. While Ramos was hailing APEC as the country's "coming out party", workers, peasants, students, indigenous peoples, women and international delegates to the several alternative forums on APEC organised in Manila were heading out onto the streets. As well as the MPFA, there was the People's Conference on Imperialist Globalisation (PCAIG). Solidarity of Labour against APEC in Manila (SLAM APEC) dressed as devils and marched and picketed through the city. PCAIG and MPFA organised two "people's caravans" of jeepneys and other vehicles that tried to get into the cordoned-off Olongapo area. As well as police roadblocks to delay the caravans, the Airforce were used to seed the clouds and induce rain on the protest caravans, and security forces successfully snarled the traffic up to Subic to such a standstill that it became impossible to proceed by vehicle. Neither caravan was able to reach Subic, but by that time, the world already knew of the widespread anti-APEC activity that overshadowed what was supposed to be the main event. (The Big Picture is a quarterly bulletin of GATT Watchdog. A year's subscription costs NZ $15. For more information please write to GATT Watchdog, PO Box 1905, Christchurch 8015 Aotearoa/New Zealand. Fax 64 3 3668035. Email: ) ===================================================================== GATT Watchdog, Box 1905, Otautahi (Christchurch) 8015, Aotearoa (New Zealand). Ph 64 3 3662803 Fax 64 3 3484763 ===================================================================== From cnic at kiwi.co.jp Tue Feb 4 11:29:03 1997 From: cnic at kiwi.co.jp (Citizens' Nuclear Information Center) Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 11:29:03 +0900 (JST) Subject: [asia-apec 349] Asian nuclear crisis Message-ID: <199702040229.LAA28079@kiwi.co.jp> Dear colleagues in Asia, I believe following message is very important for Asia-APEC activists. It relates heavily with nuclear states' ambitions of making an international radwaste disposal site at somewhere in the world. We can never allow to make an initial example in Asia. Mika Obayashi Citizens' Nuclear Information Center Japan //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// > Date: Mon, 3 Feb 1997 15:33:01 +0900 (KST) > Mime-Version: 1.0 > To: cnic-jp@po.iijnet.or.jp > From: Anna Gyorgy > Subject: For Mika Obayashi > > 3 February 1997: ACTION ALERT - > > PLEASE REPLY TO: Green Korea (fax: > (822)325-5677) and Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU) > (fax: (886-2)362-3458) > > TAIWANESE AND KOREAN ACTIVISTS WORK TOGETHER TO PREVENT RAD-WASTE DUMPING > IN NORTH KOREA: Korean Hunger Strike Participants Expelled from Taiwan; > Protests Continue in both Countries > > ACTION REQUESTED: Organizations are urged to send a statement of opposition > to the planned nuclear waste exports and support for citizen actions to > prevent this dangerous precedent. On January 20, 1997, a deal between > Taiwan and North Korea was announced that would help "solve" Taiwan's > nuclear waste problem. Taiwan would ship 60,000 barrels of radioactive > ("low-level") material to famine-plagued North Korea within two years for > storage, with an option to increase the total to 200,000 barrels. "Taiwan > seems to have hardly imagined that opposition to its plan would grow so > widely and rapidly under the lead of the Seoul government and the South > Korean people. For the impoverished North, meanwhile, the nuclear deal is > one that cannot be called off, because of the large amounts of foreign > currency involved. Taipei has not disclosed the terms of the deal, but > activists have claimed that it will pay Pyongyang up to $227 million." -- > Editorial, "Korea Times", 30 Jan. 97 > > Environmental activists in Korea and Taiwan categorically oppose the > dumping of nuclear waste "in other countries' backyards." Both Green Korea > and TEPU called on their countries to offer technological and economic > assistance to North Korea, instead of exporting nuclear waste. ACTIONS: > On Tuesday, 28 January a group of six Green Korea activists began a hunger > strike in front of the Taiwan Power Company headquarters ("Taipower") in > Taipei to oppose the planned shipments. Their action was fully supported > and coordinated with the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU), a > national NGO that has long opposed nuclear construction in Taiwan, and past > waste 'adventures.' (see "Background") On Thursday, 30 January, the > peaceful group, seated in front of Taipower with banners against the waste > export, was assaulted by ultra-right-wing Chinese-Taiwanese nationalists as > police stood by. Later that day the group was expelled from Taiwan. > Returning to Seoul in a wheelchair because of injuries from the attack, Dr. > Jang Won, professor at Taejon University and secretary general of Green > Korea, announced that the group would continue the protest in front of the > Taiwanese Representative Office in downtown Seoul. (South Korea's > government switched their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing > four years ago.) There the group, joined by other supporters, talked with > the public and kept vigil, spending a cold winter night on the sidewalk > Friday. At 2 am 1st February Dr. Jang was taken by police to the hospital > because of his poor health; he is continuing his fast there. Back in > Taipei, a group of environmental activists continued the protest in front > of Taipower until Sunday evening. In Seoul, Green Korea will continue its > vigil and signature collecting in front of the Taiwanese Office, weekends > 11am-7pm, weekdays 8am-8pm. "If Taiwan is incapable of managing the > nuclear waste problems, it should not develop nuclear power. The Taiwan > government must terminate construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant > and immediately stop operating the No. 1,2 and 3 nuclear power plants. The > only way to solve the nuclear waste problem is not to produce wastes in the > first place." -- from a news release issued by the "Taipower Headquarters > Protesters" on 1 February. > > BACKGROUND: Since 1982 the state-owned Taiwan Power Company (Taipower) has > shipped low and mid-level nuclear waste from its three nuclear power plants > to the Long-men Nuclear Waste Depository on Orchid Island. Also called Lan > Yu, the beautiful island with its unique ecosystem is home to 3,000 Yami, > the most isolated of Taiwan's indigenous peoples. After storing 98,000 > barrels of nuclear waste on the island, Taipower faced widespread protests > in 1995 when it broke its promise to the Yami to cancel any expansion of > the facility and approved plans to store an additional 100,000 drums of > nuclear waste in Long-Men. The Yami fear contamination of soil and sea from > leaking barrels; the Taiwan Atomic Energy Council has admitted that some of > the drums of waste have rusted. After and international campaign charging > Taipower and the AEC with environmental racism over their waste program, > the expansion program was withdrawn. Now we see a new form of > "environmental imperialism" in which richer countries try to pass on their > dangerous radioactive waste legacy to others which desperately need foreign > exchange to help their economic situation. A victory over this export > attempt will set an important international precedent against storing > "waste for cash" in other nations' back yards and strengthen the movement > towards nuclear phase-out. > > ADDITIONAL NEWS: > > * "Korea Times", 1 Feb. 1997: Korean Lawmakers and Environmentalists > go to Taiwan Following the expulsion of the Green Korea hunger strikers, > four South Korean National Assembly members from two opposition parties > left for Taiwan to protest the planned shipments of waste to North Korea. > "In their protest visit to Taiwan, done jointly with the civic group Korean > Federation of Environmental Movement, the lawmakers will deliver to the > Taiwan government the Korean National Assembly's statement signed by 277 > lawmakers urging Taiwan to withhold the nuclear waste shipment plans.... > Meanwhile, the political circle of the nation reacted furiously to > Taiwanese harassment against and deportation of Korean environmentalists, > who were engaging in peaceful protest there Thursday." > > * "The Korea Herald", 1 Feb: South Korean government opposes deal > ""The government regards the expulsion of the peaceful Korean protesters as > regretful,' said a Foreign Ministry official. 'Taiwan's planned export of > nuclear waste violates international practices and amounts to an immoral > act affecting the environment of the entire Korean Peninsula.' > > (end) ********************************** Citizens' Nuclear Information Center 1-59-14-302, Higashi-nakano Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164, JAPAN phone; 81-3-5330-9520, fax; 81-3-5330-9530 e-mail; From cnic at kiwi.co.jp Wed Feb 5 17:32:25 1997 From: cnic at kiwi.co.jp (Citizens' Nuclear Information Center) Date: Wed, 5 Feb 1997 17:32:25 +0900 (JST) Subject: [asia-apec 350] CNIC protests Taipower sending radwaste to N. Korea Message-ID: <199702050832.RAA11340@kiwi.co.jp> Dear Friends, Citizens' Nuclear Information Center released the following appeal regarding the issue of Taiwan Power Co. attempting to send Taiwanese nuclear waste to North Korea. Citizens' Nuclear Information Center 1-59-14-302, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164, Japan phone 81-3-5330-9520, fax 81-3-5330-9530 contact: Mika Obayashi //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// Taiwan should stop its plan of shipping nuclear waste to North Korea The Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, CNIC, declares its strong opposition to Taiwan Power Co.'s (Taipower Co.) plan to ship nuclear waste to North Korea. At the beginning of this year, Taipower Co. disclosed that a contract for the storage of radwaste has been made with N. Korea and it will likely start to ship radwaste in about a month from Orchid Island, where the nation's temporary low level waste storage facility is sited. According to newspapers, N. Korea will take charge of 60,000 barrels of radwaste in the next two years at the cost of $1, 300 per barrel, possibly expanding the storage capacity up to 200,000 barrels. At this absurdly low price, we cannot believe that the radioactive waste will be stored safely. Taiwan has also hinted at the possibility of final disposal of the waste at the site. There is no reference about what the definition of "low level" waste is and how they will treat the waste. They say they will use an exhausted coal mine as a storage facility, but this is just dumping the nuclear waste in the ground and abondoning it. This is likely to cause contamination of ground water and is a rash act not only for the people of Korean Peninsula, but also for the whole world. The danger inherent in the transportation of radioactive waste should also be considered. The waste from Taiwan will be forced to sail among populous countries such as China, South Korea and Japan. If an accident occurs during the shipment, the effect to the environment could be extremely severe. Some parts of the waste are supposed to be encased in flammable bitumen, and many concerns remain about the possibility of a fire accident during the transportation and handling of the waste. Furthermore, there seems to be no reporting of the issue inside of North Korea. Is it possible for an issue such as this with effects that could last for generations to be decided upon without anything being announced to the people of North Korea? If the plan is realized, it may be that North Korea will become a dump site for Taiwan's nuclear policy. The plan is tyrannical and unfair. It forces another nation and another nation's people to accept all the detritus from Taiwan's nuclear power plants. If they cannot take on that responsibility, Taiwan should be disqualified from operating nuclear power plants, even before discussing reactor safety. We are terribly worried that the plan will open the way to the international practice of off loading nuclear waste upon other nations. Japanese nuclear industries also have some responsibilities in this issue. In Taiwan there has been strong opposition to the Taiwan's 4th nuclear power plant site, Lungmen. Last autumn, the decision to construct the plants was adopted in the Taiwan Parliament despite 6,000 demonstrators who surrounded the parliament building. Knowing this, three big Japanese companies, Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi, have gotten involved in this plan. We urge them to withdraw their plan to export nuclear reactors and turbines to Taiwan because of its irresponsible nuclear back-end policy. We, CNIC, think global morality dictates that all nuclear waste should be treated inside of the country which produced the waste, at their own risk. We strongly urge that all interested parties should fulfill their responsibility at this time when international criticism has been raised against Taiwan Power Company. ********************************** Citizens' Nuclear Information Center 1-59-14-302, Higashi-nakano Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164, JAPAN phone; 81-3-5330-9520, fax; 81-3-5330-9530 e-mail; From daga at HK.Super.NET Mon Feb 10 11:27:56 1997 From: daga at HK.Super.NET (daga) Date: Mon, 10 Feb 1997 10:27:56 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 351] PacRim Trade/Env request Message-ID: <2.2.16.19970210102125.096fcd4a@is1.hk.super.net> The Pacific Environment and Resources Center (PERC) is looking for information from organizations working on Pacific Rim trade and environment issues, especially regarding the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). PERC would like to learn what groups are currently involved in APEC issues, what kinds of work are under way and how environmentalists are organizing around the APEC meetings due to take place in Vancouver this year. We want to hear your opinions on priority areas for environmental activism around Asia-Pacific trade liberalization and your ideas on how to increase the effectiveness of environmental NGOs working on APEC issues. PERC plans to use its experience in outreach, education and policy analysis to influence public and political opinion on APEC. We will engage our international network of environmental partners in forecasting its implications for natural areas and monitoring the corporations and agencies taking advantage of APEC's liberalization. They will increase awareness in their own countries while encouraging greater NGO participation in APEC activities. PERC's expertise lies in education, advocacy and policy analysis. Locally, we educate and activate citizens of all ages about global environmental problems and train teachers to do the same in their classrooms. Internationally, PERC advocates protection of endangered resources and works in partnerships with environmentalists in China, the Russian Far East, Canada, Bolivia and the United States. PERC collaborates with environmental activists, professionals and journalists to inform consumers and policy-makers about ecological problems to enforce environmental laws. We monitor multinational corporations, international financing agencies and other government programs that encourage the extraction of natural resources. By providing information and technical and financial support and training, we help communities abroad to strengthen law and policy that will protect natural resources. Through exchanges of environmental educators and resources specialists we provide opportunities for people to learn about international environmental problems and solutions and build networks. PERC will be monitoring APEC activities over the next year and helping environmental NGOs prepare and organize for the November 1997 APEC meeting in Vancouver. This meeting presents an opportunity to place environmental issues in the Asia-Pacific Region - especially issues such as forest and fisheries destruction in British Columbia and the Pacific Northwest - on the agenda for APEC leaders. To take advantage of this opportunity PERC would like to start preparing now. To share your ideas and suggestions, please contact Paige Fischer at PERC: 1055 Fort Cronkhite Sausalito, CA 94965 (ph) 415-332-8200 (fax) 415-332-8167 perc@igc.apc.org From daga at HK.Super.NET Tue Feb 11 11:54:22 1997 From: daga at HK.Super.NET (daga) Date: Tue, 11 Feb 1997 10:54:22 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 352] Research on APEC and NGOs Message-ID: <2.2.16.19970211104751.1f0fc9d4@is1.hk.super.net> following is the abstract of a thesis entitled International NGO activity and sustainable development: the case of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Those interested can directly get in touch with the author at the indicated e-mail address. Henry Leveson-Gower _________________________________________________ National Centre for Development Studies Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies The Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA Tel: 61 (0)6 274 1449 Fax: 61 (0)6 274 1878 Email: Hleveson-gower@dest.gov.au Abstract This study examines the nature of NGO activity linked with APEC and their possible role in promoting sustainable development. Different theories of social movements are identified to use as a framework to assist in understanding NGO activity linked with APEC, including new social movement theory, resource mobilisation theory and the politics of influence. It is concluded that NGOs involved in activities linked with APEC are acting as agents for change seeking to influence both civil society and political structures to promote sustainable development, mainly through articulating alternative visions and meanings for sustainable development. It is suggested that resource mobilisation theory has limited explanatory usefulness in understanding this process. Different NGOs involved in these activities do have different understandings of sustainable development, different views of their role and make different strategic judgements. These interwoven differences underlie the central debate amongst NGOs on whether or not to engage with APEC suggesting a need for an increased self-reflective dialogue amongst these NGOs. From daga at HK.Super.NET Fri Feb 14 12:43:06 1997 From: daga at HK.Super.NET (daga) Date: Fri, 14 Feb 1997 11:43:06 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 353] ASEAN to boost EU trade Message-ID: <2.2.16.19970214113634.30475e9e@is1.hk.super.net> Leaked draft document puts focus on economic co-operation Asean to boost EU trade Duncan Hughes in Singapore South China Morning Post February 14, 1997 Projects designed to boost trade and investment between Southeast Asia and Europe are revealed in a leaked copy of the draft joint declaration to be announced at the end of a ministerial meeting today. The proposals from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean)-EU ministerial meeting closely follow previous declarations by the two trading partners, but they will serve as the latest high-level statement to develop growing economic ties. In the declaration, member states back the view that regional trade blocs will enhance global trade so long as they embrace the spirit and procedures of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It says the WTO will continue to play a central role in ensuring a more open rule-based international trading system. The declaration reaffirms member states' commitment to implementing the Uruguay Round agreements. It states: "Asean and the EU are among the most dynamic economic regions in the world today. The EU is the world's largest trading entity, while Asean is one of the fastest growing regions in the world. This provides a sound basis for dynamic economic co-operation." A ministerial meeting today is expected to finalise the declaration, but it is also likely to set the framework for additional measures. The declaration describes the potential for expanding trade as "tremendous" and gives an undertaking to boost awareness of business opportunities amongst their respective business communities. It also calls on member states to minimize impediments to inter-regional trade. These measures include: - Sharing information about regional experiences. The EU is implementing the Single Market and Asean is implementing the Asean Free Trade Area; - Improving customs co-operation; - Extending the EU-Asean patents and trademarks programme of co-operation; and - Adopting compatible structures, standards and conformity assessment procedures. The ministers agreed additional liberalisation of investment conditions would increase investment flows. Governments have undertaken to improve contacts between Asian and European business by facilitating networking and dissemination of information. They also announced the formation of an agency that will aim to link small and medium-sized businesses backed moves to set up an industrialist roundtable. The document states: "As economic links strengthen, the role of the private sector will become more vital. Asean and the EU are committed to working towards the encouragement of private-sector initiatives which will facilitate greater co-operation." From alarm at HK.Super.NET Sat Feb 15 08:49:49 1997 From: alarm at HK.Super.NET (ALARM) Date: Sat, 15 Feb 1997 07:49:49 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 354] #4/ APL Transport Strike vs Deregulation Message-ID: Date: 07 Feb 97 16:06:18 -0800 From: LEARN To: alarm@HK.Super.NET Subject: #4/ APL Transport Strike vs Deregulation Alliance of Progressive Labor Campaign Report 6 February 1997 February 5 was Marked as a National Day of Protest APL Transport Unions Paralyzed Key Cities in the Philippines ------------------------------------------------------------- Last 5 February, various progressive groups staged different forms of protest actions in all major cities of the Philippines to stop the full implementation of the downstream oil industry deregulation. The National Day of Protest was led by the Bukluran ng mga Mamamayan Laban sa Oil Industry Deregulation or BUKLOD (Citizen's Alliance Against the Oil Industry Deregulation) -- a coalition composed of the Alliance of Progressive Labor, the Freedom from Debt Coalition, religious groups and some legislators. The National Day of Protest was marked by transport strikes as well as massive mobilizations in Manila, Cebu, Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iligan and Tacloban. Strong public sympathy was noted in almost all cities. The Issue..... Last year, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act 8180, also known as the Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996. The law intends to deregulate the oil industry in two phases. Phase I started last March 1996 and Phase II was scheduled to be implemented this 8 February 1997. Phase I includes the restructuring of the tariff and tax structure of oil and oil products as well as the implementation of an Automatic Pricing Mechanism (APM), while Phase II involves the total removal of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (a buffer fund set up years ago to theoretically cushion consumers against oil price fluctuations) and the APM allowing market forces to determine oil and oil products. The idea behind RA 8180, as the government claims, is to secure free competition in the oil industry which at the present is 96% controlled by Shell, Caltex and Petron (a privatized oil company). However, a careful perusal of the law would reveal that such an objective will not be met. On the contrary, deregulating the oil industry while imposing a 4% tariff differential in favor of refined oil products, a huge oil stock requirement, and a ban on predatory pricing, not to mention the huge capital requirement of setting up oil refineries and oil stations around the country, would make it hard for new players to enter the oil industry and therefore leave the market very vulnerable to the manipulation of the said oil companies. In fact since last year, there were very few new players who came into the picture most, if not all of which are merely oil and oil product retailers. Deregulating the oil industry at a time when the market is still controlled by only three oil companies would further entrench these companies hold on the market and leave consumers vulnerable to their price manipulations. ....The People's Response As early as March last year, before the Congress finally passed RA 8180, the Freedom from Debt Coalition and the Alliance of Progressive Labor started warning the public about the dangers of the new law and the growing powers of the oil companies. Several protest actions were held to project the people's opposition to RA 8180. However, other equally serious issues superseded the campaign. It was only in January of 1997 when the campaign started picking up again. In a press conference held late January, the APL, FDC and the religious sector announced their intentions to mount a massive, nationally-coordinated campaign to stop the implementation of the second phase of RA 8180. The Ramos Administration, for its part ordered the earlier implementation of Phase II of the oil industry deregulation. This move forced the APL to prepare for regional transport strikes in Davao, Cebu, Cagayan de Oro and Zamboanga. Later, various independent transport groups in Bukidnon, Iligan, Ilo-ilo, General Santos and Bacolod declared that they would join the APL-led transport strikes. A few days later, the BUKLOD coalition was formed and declared 5 February as a National Day of Protest. The National Day of Protest The National day of Protest was marked by massive mobilizations in Manila, Cebu, Bacolod, Ilo-ilo, General Santos, Davao and Zamboanga. In Manila alone, about 7,000 workers, students and women activists participated in a march rally which started in the University of Sto. Tomas (UST) at around 12:00 PM. From UST, the protesters marched to Malacanang (Official address of Pres. Ramos) where they breached police barricades and held a one-hour protest rally in front of the presidential palace. From there, the rally moved on to the Senate where leaders of sectoral organizations lambasted the Legislators for passing RA 8180. But the high point of the national day of protest was the transport strikes led by the APL in Cebu, Davao, Cagayan de Oro, Bukidnon, Zamboanga. Other transport groups held similar actions in Quezon City, Iligan, Cotabato and General Santos. The most successful transport strike was In Cagayan de Oro. An APL affiliate, Transport Federation of Cagayan de Oro (TRAFECO), paralyzed 98% of the cities transportation. Even busses from the city to the countryside was 99% paralyzed. In Cebu City, more than 80% of the cities transport system was paralyzed. the transport strike was led by Mandaue Drivers and OperatorsA Association, an APL affiliate, together with its transport alliance -- ANDAR.The City Mayor ordered various government agencies to try to stop the strike. Several instances of harassment were reported. However, failing to stop the mass action, the City Mayor later called for a conciliatory meeting with the transport leaders. In Davao, another APL affiliate, Southeastern Mindanao Diversified Drivers and OperatorsA Cooperative (SEMMDOC), paralyzed 85% of public transportation. In some routes, 100% participation rate was reported (Obrero and Kalinan). The local government was forced to suspend classes in all levels. This was achieved despite the press conference held by the Davao Chapter of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN Davao) stating that they will not join the transport strike because they still have to study the issue. They even erroneously claimed that only 35% of the transport workers joined the strike. In Zamboanga, PASADOZ-APL and FOJODAZ paralyzed 80% of the public transportation, 80% in Northern Bukidnon and 90% in Western Bukidnon. In other areas such as Iligan, Cotabato, General Santos, Bacolod and Ilo-ilo, the transport strike was not as successful but they were nonetheless felt by their local governments. Figures from these areas are still to be collected. The National Day of Protest prompted the Senate to call for an emergency hearing of the Energy Committee today, 6 February. While the Senate Committee is yet to submit its recommendation, it is quite impossible for them to rush a law in time to stop the full implementation of the oil industry deregulation. This would mean that the APL, together with the BUKLOD coalition would have to move on to the next phase of its campaign -- exposing the anti-consumer practices of the giant oil companies. From alarm at pw.net Sat Feb 15 19:25:41 1997 From: alarm at pw.net (alarm) Date: Sat, 15 Feb 1997 18:25:41 +0800 Subject: [asia-apec 355] Appeal From Pakistani Postal Workers Message-ID: <33058F25.1BD@pw.net> URGENT APPEAL FROM PAKISTANI POSTAL WORKERS Dear comrades, It is not the first time that the Postal bureaucracy has attacked the employees. The History of the postal administration is full of such state attacks against the labour and employees of the postal organisation of Pakistan. Neither this is the first attack against Mr Abdul Maroof Azad for his uncompromising and relentless class struggle as Secretary General of All Pakistan Postmaster General Employees Union (CBA) of Balochistan province and Central Chairman of the Pakistan Trade Union Defence Campaign. The Postal administration had previously registered five false cases in the labour courts which are still under trial. However this time the postal administration instead of going to courts directly, conspired with the police to force Mr Abdul Maroof Azad to submit to the will of the Postal bureaucracy and not to fight against their corruption and illegal activities. It is worth mentioning that this time the postal administration made the stealing of an old motorcycle, which was officially under the custody of Mr Abdul Maroof Azad, the pretext for initiating a criminal case against him. The motorcycle had been stolen one year before and the report for this was registered in the concerned police station and the postal administration was also informed accordingly. However during all this period no efforts were made by the police and the postal administration took no departmental action in this regard. As soon as Mr Abdul Maroof wrote letter s to the postal administration to stop their corrupt practices and illegal activities, the Postmaster general, instead of initiating inquires in the right direction, registered a false case of stealing the motorcycle against Mr Abdul Maroof Azad. The police is harassing Mr Abdul Maroof Azad and the members of his family. The employees of postal organisation of Balochistan are bravely fighting the vindictive and repressive policies of the postal bureaucracy. We are not afraid of these coward activities of the anti-labour forces. Although our enemy is the postal bureaucracy which enjoys the support of the armed institutions of the state, we have on our side the force of labour. This force will be most effective only if we organise ourselves, without prejudice to the regional, ethnic and religious divisions, against all the anti-labour forces and bureaucracy at international level. We, believing in the international solidarity of labour, appeal to all labour organisations of the world to write immediately letters of protest to stop the use of state repression and torture against all active trade union officer bearers and the use of police against Mr Abdul Maroof Azad to the following officials of the Pakistan Postal Administration: The Director General Pakistan Post Office Islamabad Pakistan Fax: + 92 51 851848 The Postmaster General Balochistan Quetta Pakistan Fax: + 92 81 442193 We hope that labour organisations from around the world will intervene actively and support us against injustices and repression and show international labour solidarity. Our immediate demands are: Withdrawal of all charges against Mr Abdul Maroof Azad and stop police harassment against him Stop vindictive activities of the Postmaster General, Balochistan, Quetta Accept the justified demands of the postal employees Stop the intervention of the postal administration in the affairs of the union. Yours sincerely, Nasir Ali General Secretary National Organisation of Postal Employees (NOPE) Pakistan (CBA) Balochistan Quetta Division Quetta Tfn: + 92 81 9201399 Copies of solidarity messages can also be emailed c/o 100723.2362@compuserve.com From daga at HK.Super.NET Mon Feb 17 12:58:15 1997 From: daga at HK.Super.NET (daga) Date: Mon, 17 Feb 1997 11:58:15 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 356] Dec. 26 Labour Law - Analysis, Part I Message-ID: <2.2.16.19970217115141.09471ee8@is1.hk.super.net> Korean Confederation of Trade Unions --------------------------------------------------------- The December 26, 1996 Labour Law Amendment: the further violation of the Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining The Run-up to December 26, 1996 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has, since March 1993 (at the 255th Governing Body meeting, case number 1629), repeatedly called on the Korean government to amend the industrial relations laws in compliance with the principle of freedom of association and the core ILO Conventions, Nos. 87, 98, and 151. The ILO specifically recommended the repeal of the 'prohibition of multiple unions', the 'prohibition on teachers and government employees to form or join a trade union', the 'prohibition on third party intervention', and the 'excessive administrative intervention in the internal union affairs'. ILO also advised the Korean government to narrow the scope of 'public utility services' where the right to strike is restricted. The ILO recommendation followed the failure on the part of the Korean government to ratify the core ILO Conventions since its membership in the UN labour organisation on December 9, 1991. In response to government inaction the Korean Trade Union Council, the 11 member industrial federations of the Korean Congress of Independent Industrial Federations, including the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union, together with the FIET, PSI, IMF, IFBWW, WCOTP, IFFTU, and IFJ, in March to May 1992, filed a joint complaint against the Korean government to the ILO's Freedom of Association Committee. In March 1993, the Korean government announced its commitment to reform the labour-related laws in the autumn regular session of the National Assembly to remove the clauses which were in a fundamental contradiction with the freedom of association guaranteed by the Korean Constitution and the ILO Convention No. 87. The government of President Kim Young Sam, however, reneged on its commitment when it postponed the labour law reform indefinitely in August 1993 just prior to the opening of the National Assembly. In April 1996, the Korean government initiated another round of efforts for labour law reform. President Kim Young Sam established a Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform with a mandate to produce a comprehensive proposal for the legislative amendment and the reform of the attitudes toward industrial relations. The thirty-member Commission, composed of five labour representatives, five employer representatives, and twenty 'public interest' representatives, conducted series of public hearings and seminars to identify the issues to be dealt in the Commission. The Commission began its work to produce proposals for legislative amendment in earnest through a nine member drafting committee. In the beginning of the Commission, there were some concerns about the sincerity of the government. The government tried to lay to rest the concerns raised especially by the international community by issuing a firm commitment of intention to amend to laws which contravene the principle of freedom of association. This took the form of an official letter to the OECD in October, just prior to the final decision of the Council for Korea accession. The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions took part in the Commission when it began in May till November. The Commission identified some 148 items which required consensus for legislative amendment. The Commission succeeded in reaching agreement in some 107 items. However, no agreement was able to be reached on the clauses which the ILO has identified as in breach of the principle of freedom of association due to strong opposition from the employers. The Commission's first stage work for legislative amendment came to an end without resolving the deadlock over these issues. In a last minute effort, the 'public interest' representatives tabled an independent proposal on the issues which escaped the Commission's ability. The Commission reported to the government the proposals for legislative amendment together with the independent proposal by the 'public interest' representatives. The government began its own process to produce a draft bill of amendment. The draft bill of amendment gazetted for public notice in early December, however, made no inroad on the clauses which have been found by ILO to be in contravention of the principle of freedom of association. Furthermore, the government disregarded many of the consensus proposals of the Commission. In doing so the Korean government reneged on its repeated commitment to comply with the ILO recommendations and its 'solemn commitment' made to the OECD. The trade union movement voiced a unified opposition to the government's draft bill. This was matched by equally strong reaction from the opposition political parties. Government unilaterally convened an extraordinary session of the National Assembly, and on December 26 passed the amendment bills for the labour-related laws and the National Security Planing Agency Act in a pre-dawn session without giving prior notice to the National Assembly members from the opposition parties. The amendment to the labour law rammed through the National Assembly contained an important last minute change stipulating a 3 year postponement of the lifting of the ban on union pluralism, continuing the outlawing of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions. The government had, when it began its preparation of its own draft bill for labour law reform, produced some amendments for the education related laws. These changes, while falling short of guaranteeing the freedom of association to teachers, guaranteeing their right to form or join unions, were seen to open the possibility of some form of plurality of teachers organisations. However, the government failed to table these amendments to the National Assembly, resulting in the continuing prohibition of freedom of association for teachers and the continuing outlawing of the teachers' union, the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union. The Reactions to the December 26 Act The government's bulldozing of the amendment bill for the 4 labour related laws * the Trade Union and Industrial Relations Adjustment Act (replacing the Trade Union Act and Labour Disputes Adjustment Act), the Labour Standards Act, the Labour Relations Commission Act, and the Workers Participation and Cooperation Promotion Act * and the National Security Planing Agency Act * provoked strong resistance from all sections of the society. The opposition parties immediately decided to file a constitutional petition contesting the constitutionality of these laws on the basis of the violation of the National Assembly procedural regulations. The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions launched an immediate general strike to protest the government action calling for their total nullification. The Federation of Korean Trade Unions also joined in this general strike. The general strike and protest action is now in 25th day as of January 19, 1997. On January 13, 1997, some 850 Catholic priests issued a statement and held a special mass at the Myongdong Cathedral denouncing the government action. Similar actions are taken by other major religious bodies in south Korea. Large community of professionals also joined in this protest action. Over 2,500 universities professors have joined the protest action by issuing special statements condemning the government action. Hundreds of civic and social organisations have joined in this nation-wide campaign of protest. The wide spread protest action, triggered by the government's pre-dawn raid of the National Assembly, focused on the very un- or anti-democratic nature of the government action. The wide spread expressions of protest have declared the strike action of the trade union movement as a legitimate action of resistance, invoking the ILO Conventions which guarantee the right to strike against general economic and social policies which affect great number of working people. These protest actions have arisen from a grave concern about the authoritarian and intolerant attitude and practice of the government which undermine the very foundation of democracy, which can only lead to greater social unrest rather than social cohesion necessary for a concerted effort to adapt to the rapidly changing geo-economic and geopolitical environment. The concern over the possible unconstitutionality of the government action was raised by two separate regional courts. On January 16, 1997, a judge at the Changwon Regional Court, in presiding over the application for injunction on the strike, requested an adjudication by the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the December 26 passage of the labour laws before deciding on the legitimacy of the strike action as an exercise of the right to resistance enshrined in the Constitution. He stated, "In order to determine whether the current strike is legal or illegal, there has to be prior determination on the question of the constitutionality of the passage of the amended labour and security related laws." As a result, the application for an injunction on the strike undertaken by the trade union, issued by the management of the Changwon Plant of the Hyundai Precision Industry, has to wait till a decision is made by the Constitutional Court. A similar judicial action was undertaken by a judge of the Daejon Regional Court on January 17. Is the December 26 Amendment in Compliance with the ILO Recommendations? The December 26, 1996 amendment of the labour related laws fail to comply with the repeated ILO recommendation and the core Conventions with regard to freedom of association. 1. Ban on Union Plurality While the December 26 Amendment repeals the original clause which were used to ban union pluralism, which have been used to refuse the registration of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and 12 out of 21 affiliated federations. However, KCTU and the 12 affiliated industrial or group federations will continue to be 'outlawed' for three years until year 2000. The amendment repeals the original Article 3:5 of the Trade Union Act which disqualifies an organisation if it has "the same organisation object as an existing trade union, or it aims to interfere with a normal operation of such union" from being recognised as a trade union thus denying the rights and protection specified in the Act. Here the "same organisation object" refers to the scope of potential membership base of an organisation. For example, if a union defines the employees a company as the basis of its organisation and anticipated target membership, then another 'trade union' cannot claim the employees of the same company as the basis of its organisation and membership. And such an organisation cannot claim the recognition and protection as a trade union provided by the law. The same applies to federation of unions. If a federation claims a particular industry as the basis or anticipated target membership of its organisation, then there cannot be another organisation which claims the same industry as the basis of its organisation and membership. This has come to known as the prohibition of 'union plurality' or the prohibition of 'multiple unionism'. The 'amended' labour law removes the problem clause in the previous law but adds two new clauses in the by-laws (addenda) stipulating a period of 'moratorium' on 'union plurality' at the individual enterprise level and federation or national centre levels. The by-law (addenda) article 6 states: 1. In case a trade union is already in existence, it shall be disallowed until December 31, 1999, despite the Article 5, to form a new trade union whose target constituency for potential membership is the same as the already existing organisation. Furthermore, in case a trade union is already in existence in a business concern or a workplace, it shall be disallowed until December 31, 2001 to form a new trade union whose target constituency for potential membership is the same as the existing union. 2. The Minister of Labour must refuse the application for registration if it is not in compliance with the above clause. 3. The Minster of Labour must, until December 31, 1999, formulate the necessary procedural regulations for methods of collective bargaining for creation of a single bargaining unit to come into effect upon the surpassing of the postponement specified in the above clause 1. The amendment bill * which brings the former Trade Union Act and Labour Dispute Adjustment Act into one new Trade Union and Industrial Relations Adjustment Act -- passed at the 'extraordinary' session of the National Assembly, therefore, maintains the ban on 'union plouralism' for three to five years. This signifies the continued ban on or denial of registration and recognition for the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and majority of its affiliated federations, such as the Korean Federation of Metalworkers Unions and the Hyundai Trade Union Federation for three years. The amended labour law totally disregards the ILO recommendation and reneges on the commitment made by the Korean government to the OECD, repeating the performance at the time of joining the International Labour Organisation. The amended law also fails to accept the recommendation of the Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform. The "public interest representatives" at the PCIR had recommended the government to lift the moratorium for enterprise union plurality in cases where an existing trade union is deemed (by a judiciary or administrative authority, as in the case of the trade union at the Samsung Heavy Industry Co.) to be a dormant union or have been found to have habitually and systematically refused to accept membership applications. From daga at HK.Super.NET Mon Feb 17 12:58:21 1997 From: daga at HK.Super.NET (daga) Date: Mon, 17 Feb 1997 11:58:21 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 357] Dec. 26 Labour Law - Analysis, Part 2 Message-ID: <2.2.16.19970217115146.1cc793ec@is1.hk.super.net> Korean Confederation of Trade Unions --------------------------------------------------------- The December 26, 1996 Labour Law Amendment: the further violation of the Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (Part 2) 2. Ban on Freedom of Association for Teachers and Government Employees The new labour legislation enacted by the ruling party orchestrated December 26, 1996 extraordinary session of the National Assembly states: Workers may freely organize or join trade unions. However, some other separate law shall be applied to public officials [government employees] and teachers. (TUIRAA 5). The government's draft amendment bill has not given any attention to the right of government employees to organise or join unions. However, until the time of tabling the draft amendment bills to the National Assembly, the government had contemplated some changes concerning the issue of freedom of association for teachers. However, the amendment package tabled at the National Assembly by government was without the bill of amendment for laws related to teachers' organisation. The Cabinet Meeting on December 10, 1996, approved the amendment bill for 6 different laws related to industrial relations and teachers organisation prior to tabling at the National Assembly. With regard to the "freedom of association" for teachers, government proposed to revise the existing "Special Act for the Promotion of the Status of Teachers" and the "Education Act" to allow for the existence of plurality of teachers' organisations. The "reform" package * evaporated in the process of tabling -- however, left no room for mistaking the government's intention. Even if this amendment had become a law, teachers will not have been able to enjoy the right to form a teachers' union, and the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union still outlawed. The aborted government proposal paid lip-service to the idea of "freedom of association" for teachers, but made it categorically clear that the government intends to maintain the power to dictate what kind of organisation teachers can organise or join. The aborted amendment bill maintained the a fundamental denial of the freedom of choice, the very heart of the freedom of association principle. And whatever the kind of organisation teachers were able to form would not have been allowed to use the term "(trade or labour) union" in its name nor affiliate with a trade union federation, such as KCTU. The aborted government amendment bill stipulated the shape and form of "teachers organisation" and what kind and extent of right and freedom teachers can exercise. The geographical scope of the basic unit of a teachers' organisation would have coincided with the jurisdiction of a province or metropolitan city level Board of Education. (This means no school level chapters or local chapters embracing a number of schools would have been allowed.) A teachers' organisation would have had the right to engage in limited negotiation or consultation with a Board of Education. However, a teachers organisation would have been eligible to obtain such a "right" only if it has as its members one-fifth (20%) of the teachers in the various levels of schools in the territorial boundary of the regional Board of Education, thus becoming registered as a body with negotiation or consultation status. Province or metropolitan city level teachers' organisation can form a national federation among themselves. And such a national federation would have been -- if it satisfies an eligibility requirement -- able to engage in limited negotiation or consultation with the Minister for Education. For a national federation to be eligible to meet with the Minister for Education for negotiation or consultation, it must be constituted by 10 or more province or city level organisations which enjoy negotiation/consultation status with the respective regional Board of Education. The aborted change, basically, would have opened the possibility of plurality of "teachers organisations" unlike to current situation where only the Korean Federation of Teachers Associations is allowed. The "teachers organisation", as defined by the Article 80 of the Education Act, however, would have needed to be a legally incorporated entity in line with the Article 32 of the Civil Law and registered on the basis of the "permission" of the relevant authority (in this case, the Ministry of Education). It would, therefore, been impossible to regard such an "organisation" as an "independent" or "autonomous" organisation which would have enjoyed full rights under the freedom of association. Furthermore, such an organisation would have been required to received "supervision" and "direction" of the relevant government authority (Article 37, Civil Law). The law (Article 38, Civil Law) also allows the Board of Education and the Ministry of Education the power to revoke the permission (de-registration) if an organisation were seen to conduct activities that contravene the purpose specified in its charter, violate the conditions of permission, or cause damage to public interest, or if it were found to be registered through irregular manner or fall short of the registration requirement. One critical problem with the aborted amendment was that the very party which would have met with a teachers organisation for "negotiation" or "consultation" would have had the authority to register and the power to revoke the registration (de-register) of the teachers organisation in question. The proposed legislative framework would have, therefore, erected an inherent inequality between the parties involved in a "negotiation" or "consultation". However, at the end of the day, all these concerns were proved to be unnecessary as the government left out the amendment bills for teachers' organisation when it table the amendment bills for the labour related law at the National Assembly. The absence of proposed amendment for teachers organisation has caught many unaware. One interpretation is that it was an act of deception. Another views is that * although this is more of a wishful thinking * government felt the formalising of its amendment bill by introducing it at the National Assembly may have triggered a greater negative reaction, domestically and internationally, than a positive or sympathetic appreciation. 3. Third Party Intervention "Prohibition of intervention by third party" (Article 12-2, Trade Union Act) has been one of the most notorious instrument of repression used against the trade union movement. The new labour legislation enacted at the extraordinary session of the National Assembly removes much of the problem clauses but maintains the 'spirit and principle' of the prohibition, thus standing in contradiction to the spirit of the freedom of association. This is found in the clauses aimed at regulating what is permitted and what is disallowed. Following is a translation in verbatim of the amended clauses in the Article 40 (TU&IRAA) entitled as "assistance for industrial relations". I. A trade union or employer can receive the assistance of the following categories of persons in relation to collective bargaining and/or dispute activities: 1. The federation or confederation to which the concerned trade union affiliated; 2. The employer organisation to which the concerned employer is affiliated; 3. The persons registered by the concerned trade union or employer with the Labour Minister to receive assistance; 4. Any other persons who have legitimate authority in accordance with other laws. II. All other persons not specified in the above paragraph are disallowed to intervene, manipulate, or instigate collective bargaining and/or dispute activities. The amended law ignores the recommendation presented by the "public interest representative" at the Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform. The "public interest representatives had proposed to allow 'assistance' from 'third parties' who had been requested by either of the two concerned parties in the 'industrial relations' at the workplace. However, the requirement for the employers and unions to notify the Labour Minister -- specified in the new law -- introduces an unnecessary procedure, and, at the worst, opens the possibility of arbitrary regulation by the government authorities. The amended law reflects that the whole concept of 'third party intervention' and the government's perception are based on a deep- seated suspicion about industrial relations and the inherent disrespect for (and underestimation of) the autonomy (and the rigour) of the internal union dynamics, democracy, and leadership. This is made clear by the second paragraph of the article. The specification of 'banned' activities, may in fact be unconstitutional as it undermines the principle of freedom of expression. The existence of the second paragraph, accompanied by a clause for maximum penalty of 3 years imprisonment and/or 30 million Won in fine for the 'violators' (TU&IRAA 89:1), is, therefore, tantamount to maintaining the infamous "prohibition of third party intervention" without any measure of reform. 4. Trade Union Political Activity The government's amendment repeals the 'prohibition of political activities' (TUA 12:1, 2, 3) which bans the trade union support of a specific political party or a specific candidate, the collection and donation of political contribution, and the diversion of union fund for political purposes. However, this does not free trade unions to take an active role in political affairs. This is clearly recognised by the government itself as can be seen in the explanation provided by the Ministry of Labour. In its background briefing paper to the amended law, the Ministry of Labour states: "it is not desirable, in the light of the practices in the advanced industrialised countries, to stipulate additional restriction in the industrial relations law" [because] "the laws governing political activities and elections already prohibit political activities of trade unions as with other [non-political-party] social organisations". The same briefing booklet cites the relevant other laws, such as, the Article 12 of the Political Funds [Contributions] Act and the Article 87 of the Act on Election of Public Offices and Prevention of Election Fraud, which can continue to ban political activities by trade unions. Therefore, without the amendment of the laws cited by the Ministry of Labour, trade unions will continue to be unable to undertake any meaningful political activities. The ban on political activities by trade unions is, in fact, enshrined in the definition of a 'trade union' provided by the Trade Union and Industrial Relations Adjustment Act. The Paragraph 3 Article 2 defines a 'trade union' as "an organisation or a federation of organisations, which is formed independently at the initiative of workers for maintaining and improving conditions of employment and improving the economic and social status of workers". The law, however, adds a number of disqualification clauses of which following is one: "[an organisation which] takes political movement [or activities] and/or social movement [or activities] as its primary objective" (TU&IRAA 2:3e). Such a clause is at best unnecessary as trade union [labour] movement is inherently a part (an area) of or one kind (type) of 'social movement'. At the worst, such a legislation * based as it is on an 'indeterminable' concept * may lead to unnecessary confusion and arbitrary abuse. 5. Public Enterprises and Essential Public Enterprises The new labour law rammed through the National Assembly at an extraordinary pre-dawn session includes the 'railway service', 'urban bus line business', 'medical service business', 'banking business', and 'communication business' in the list of "essential public enterprise" which are subject to "compulsory arbitration" disallowing any form of collective action. The "essential public enterprise", a concept borrowed from ILO standards, was first introduced in the discussions at the Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform (PCIR) to confine the scope of "compulsory arbitration" which have been much criticised for severely restricting the basic labour right of collective action. The "essential public enterprises" is a sub-group within the category of "public enterprises" which currently is composed of 'public transport business', 'water, electricity, gas supply, and petroleum refinery business', 'public hygienic and medical service business', 'banking business', and 'broadcasting and communication business'. The original discussion in the Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform (PCIR) was focused on confining the enterprises that are subject to "compulsory arbitration". The now superseded Labour Dispute Adjustment Act calls for "compulsory arbitration" when "the Labour Relations Commission decides to refer a dispute to arbitration upon the demand of the administrative authority or ex officio with respect to public enterprise" (LDAA 30). This meant a drastic restriction on the right of collective action for a large number trade unions in a wide range of enterprises (even private sector enterprises), which happen to be categorised as "public enterprise". To overcome this problem, the PCIR introduced a concept of "essential public enterprises" as demanded by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions. The PCIR called for limiting the reliance on "compulsory arbitration" to be confined to those enterprises which belonged to this new sub-category. Together with the introduction of a new category, the PCIR originally agreed to remove "banking business", "broadcasting business", "mint works", and "enterprises located in export processing zones" from the broader 'public enterprise' category. However, the amended law maintains these in the list of "public enterprises". Furthermore, the PCIR discussion called for a separate decree which specifies the size of enterprises and the 'replaceability' conditions for listing of public enterprises. This was aimed at the removing the absurdity where a union at a hospital with 10 beds and a union at another hospital with 500 beds had their right to strike equally restricted due to the inclusion of "medical service business" in the public enterprise list. The amended law, however, ignores the recommendation of the PCIR, and does not set up any means for differentiating among the different workplaces within the same enterprise grouping. The amended law, based on the final proposal of the Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform (PCIR) extends the scope of 'compulsory arbitration' to the newly introduced sub-category of "essential public enterprises", which includes 'water, electricity, gas, and oil" services, and 'communication business'. The intention behind the introduction of the new 'essential public enterprise' category was nullified, however, in amended law, as it extends the new category to 'railways [including urban transit railway]', 'urban passenger transportation business', 'medical service business', and 'banking business'. From daga at HK.Super.NET Mon Feb 17 12:58:26 1997 From: daga at HK.Super.NET (daga) Date: Mon, 17 Feb 1997 11:58:26 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 358] Dec. 26 Labour Law - Analysis, Part 3 Message-ID: <2.2.16.19970217115151.094764fa@is1.hk.super.net> Korean Confederation of Trade Unions --------------------------------------------------------- The December 26, 1996 Labour Law Amendment: the further violation of the Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (Part 3) 6. Compulsory Arbitration The Labour Minister may refer an industrial dispute to an "emergency adjustment" by the Central Labour Relations Commission if acts of dispute are related to business of public interest, or it is of such a scope or character that there exists a danger which might substantially impair the nation's economy or endanger the daily life of the general public (LDAA 40, TU&IRAA 76). Once a "dispute" is referred to an "emergency adjustment", the parties to the dispute must "immediately suspend any act of dispute" and parties are banned from undertaking any form of dispute activities for thirty days". (TU&IRAA 77; this is a change from the current law which calls for no industrial action for twenty days [LDAA 41].) If the Central Labour Relations Commission fails to arrive at an "adjustment" of a dispute, it can decide to refer the dispute to an "arbitration". While, logically, it is possible to expect the Central Labour Relations Commission to decide against "recommending" a "compulsory arbitration", it is widely accepted that a failure to reach a settlement in "emergency adjustment" leads automatically to a "compulsory arbitration". The "arbitration" will then be undertaken by the "Central Labour Relations Commission" (TU&IRAA 79). While 'emergency adjustment' -- per se -- can be regarded as a significant institutional mechanism for 'mediation' and 'conciliation', it is held in deep distrust because it, in reality, functions as a trip-wire trigger for "compulsory arbitration" which automatically and coercively suspend all freedom and right of collective bargaining and collective action. "Compulsory arbitration" is defined in the Articles 30 to 39 of the 'old' LDAA and the Articles 62 to 70 of the new TU & IRAA. An "arbitration" can be activated in three different cases: a joint request by both parties in an industrial dispute, a request by one of the parties in accordance with the provisions of the collective agreement, and a decision by the Labour Relations Commission upon the demand of the administrative authority or ex officio with respect to public enterprise (LDAA 30). The new TU & IRAA differs from the LDAA only on the third condition. It states: the Labour Relations Commission shall arbitrate "when the Labour Relations Commission, on the basis of the recommendation of a 'Special Adjustment Committee' decided to refer a dispute to arbitration with respect to essential public enterprise" (TU&IRAA 62:3). Once a dispute is referred to "compulsory arbitration" all parties to an industrial dispute is compelled to suspend all forms dispute for 15 days (TU&IRAA 63). Any industrial action undertaken after the referral to a "compulsory arbitration" is illegal. An "award of arbitration" has "the same effect as that of a collective agreement" (TU&IRAA 70:2). A party can appeal the decision of a Local Labour Relations Commission to the Central Labour Relations Commission within 10 days of the original decision, and then begin an administrative suit within 15 days of the review decision, if it considers that an award of arbitration violates a law or is an act beyond the authority of the Commission (TU&IRAA 69). However, "The effect of an award of arbitration or decision after review rendered by a Labour Relations Commission shall not be suspended by an application for review to the Central Labour Relations Commission or bringing an administrative suit" (TU&IRAA70:1). The problem with the system and practice of "compulsory arbitration" is that it is widely abused by the "administrative authority" to suspend the basic labour rights based on very arbitrary or one-side decision. The debate in the Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform (PCIR) concentrated on reducing the extent of arbitrariness and the scope of enterprises that may be subject to "compulsory arbitration". The amended law, on surface, alleviates some of the concern by introducing the "essential public enterprise" sub-category. However, the amended law nullifies the spirit of "essential public enterprise" concept by including wide ranging variety of enterprises in the list. Furthermore, the absence of a criterion and mechanism for differentiating between the diverse individual workplaces within a type of enterprise, and for differentiating the various sections within a workplace on the degree of "essentialness" or importance leaves the system open to the same kind of abuse and arbitrariness of the "old" system. In essence, the government amendment lacks any sign of having taken effort to balance the need to guarantee the basic labour rights and the essential need of general population. 7. Administrative Interference in Internal Union Affairs The newly amended law maintains all of the provisions in the superseded Trade Union Act which allows government to intervene in the internal affairs of a trade union. ILO has, in fact called on the Korean government to remove these provisions so that unions can enjoy full freedom of association. The Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform has also recommended the government to repeal these provisions, especially the provisions which give the Ministry of Labour a power to demand unions to submit "financial statements, minutes of meetings, and other relevant documents" in order to 'mediate', 'supervise', or 'investigate' as cases arise. However, these provisions are maintained in the new law (TUIRAA 27). Furthermore, the penalty for a failure to abide by this law is increased from 'three month imprisonment or 200,000 Won in fines' to '5 million Won in fines'. New Restriction and Violations of Trade Union Rights The newly amended labour law, rather than moving closer to international labour standards as specified in the ILO Conventions, introduces new restrictions on trade union rights, adding to the existing violations of freedom of association examined by the International Labour Organisation. 1. Membership Eligibility The new law also regresses on the eligibility of union membership. In the definition of a trade union, a trade union may not be recognised as a trade union if it "allows a person who is not a worker to be a member" (TU&IRAA 2:3d) while a 'worker' is defined as one "who lives on a wage, salary, or any other income similar thereto regardless of his occupation" (TU&IRAA 2:1). While the definition leaves open whether the membership base of a union must be within the boundary of a single company (business concern), it creates important problems for the status of 'dismissed workers" (and possibly unemployed workers). The Paragraph 3d of the Article 2 which stipulates one of the conditions for disqualifying a trade union states, "any dismissed worker who has applied to the Labour Relations Commission for relief of unfair labour practice shall not be interpreted as non-worker until the decision of the review [appeals hearing] by the Central Labour Relations Commission is made." Under the superseded law, a dismissed worker could maintain his/her union membership until the Supreme Court (the highest court of the land) brings down a verdict on the validity of the dismissal. The 'eligibility' clause reflects the anachronism of 'enterprise' unionism enforced by the law to limit the organisational boundary of a union to a company. Who can become a member of a union is an issue that should be left to the decision of the union itself through its constitution and rules. This is the essence of the principle of freedom of association. In the same spirit, the union membership eligibility of a dismissed worker should be left to the decision and the rules of the union. The "public interest representatives" in the Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform proposed to repeal this particular clause so that eligibility of membership in an industrial union or a regional union can be determined by the constitution and rules of the union in question. The government initiated amendment, however, ignores the recommendation of the "public interest representatives" and takes a radical backward step from the previous law and practice by calling for an even greater restriction on freedom of association. 2. Wage Payment for Full-time Union Officers The new labour law introduces a new provision on the full-time union officers. The Article 24 of the Trade Union and Industrial Relations Adjustment Act states: I. An employee, if stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement or agreed to by the employer, can engage in the work and activities of union on full-time basis without providing labour as required by employment contract. II. The person(s) engaged in union work full-time as specified in the above paragraph ("full-time union staff") shall not receive any kind of remuneration or wage from the employer for the period of his/her term as full-time union staff. The draft bill, then, goes on to define the practice of "providing wage to a full-time union officer" as an "unfair labour practice" on the part of the employer (TU&IRRA 81d). The Korean government, in its amendment, introduces a legislative regulation not found in any other country in the world. It runs contrary to the ILO recommendation that employers should provide wage, allowance, and leave to workers representatives at the company level. The new law, in stipulating for a gradual progress towards the total termination of the current practice of wage payment to full-time union officers by the end of year 2001, declares that "trade unions must endeavour to achieve financial independence". The government is "exploiting" the principle of financial independence, turning it into a weapons against the trade union movement. This will become a devastating weapon in the current situation where unions in companies with less than 100 employees make up 63% of all the unions in Korea. The impact of this law will be crippling as the monthly financial resources of most of these unions are less than one million Won. The Korean government's legislative initiative willfully exploits that current enterprise union system. As all 'unit' unions in Korea are enterprise level unions, the trade union movement is unable to accumulate a substantial financial base. Each enterprise union is an integral union with its own president and other full-time officers. They are in no way identical to "shopstewards" or organisers or officers found in the 'industrial' unions of other countries. There is no denying that organisers and full-time officers 'employed' by industrial unions should be fully supported by the unions themselves. This principle, however, cannot apply to the specific Korean situation where an individual union at each enterprise has to finance all its activities from its circumscribed membership dues. The new legislative stipulation, therefore, can only be perceived as an attempt to emasculate the trade union movement before it transforms itself into a powerful industrial structure. 3. Right of Ratification Under the previous law, a union, following its constitution and rules, can put a 'provisional' collective bargaining agreement arrived through negotiations with the employer to a vote of the general meeting of the union membership. This is similar to the 'ratification' procedure that a government may be required to undertake to adopt a binding international agreement or treaty. The previous legislative arrangement does not stipulate a ratification process; nor does it specifically 'outlaw' such a process. The ratification process is a democratic procedure that strengthens the accountability of a union leadership and the democratic participation of the membership in the union's decision making. As such it is a matter that should be left to the constitution and the rules of the individual union. The new law, however, paves the way for an automatic adoption of a legally binding CBA based on the agreement between the employers and a handful of union officers. It says: "the representative of a union has the right to negotiate and adopt a collective bargaining agreement on behalf of the union or the members" (TU&IRAA 29:1). While the new legislation does not enforce such an arrangement, it does introduce a legal basis for a judicial or administrative intervention against a popular rejection of an agreement between the union officer corps and the employer. This points to a worst case scenario of a collusion between the elected union leaders and employers. Such a situation may exist in weak or nascent unions or in situation where 'yellow unionism' is prevalent, which could be said to have been the case in Korea for a long time. The internal decision making procedure such as this, therefore, is a matter that should be left to the members and the organisation itself to decide. It is a matter that can only be decided by the members themselves by balancing the need for democracy and efficiency as they perceive. From daga at HK.Super.NET Mon Feb 17 12:58:34 1997 From: daga at HK.Super.NET (daga) Date: Mon, 17 Feb 1997 11:58:34 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 359] Dec. 26 Labour Law - Analysis, Part 5 Message-ID: <2.2.16.19970217115159.22ef51e2@is1.hk.super.net> Korean Confederation of Trade Unions --------------------------------------------------------- The December 26, 1996 Labour Law Amendment: the further violation of the Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (Part 5) 11. Increase in the Penalties The government amendment (the newly created Trade Union and Industrial Relations Adjustment Act) contains a total of 16 penalty clauses for the trade union (workers), 3 for the management, and 5 which can apply commonly to both the management and the trade union. This is an increase of 4 for the workers from the original 12. Furthermore, the severity of penalty for contravening workers is greatly increased. For example, the current law contains only one case which is liable for a maximum penalty of 3 to 5 years imprisonment and/or 5 million to 10 million Won fine. However, in the amended law there are 4 cases which are liable for a maximum of 3 years imprisonment and/or 30 million Won in fine. The fine that a contravening trade union or persons has increase in general, while in some cases it has increased by 25 times. The government amendment makes the industrial relations a minefield of 'crimes', aimed at making criminals out of trade unionists. These changes reflect that the so-called labour laws are oriented towards 'regulating', 'controlling', and 'restricting' trade union activities. Such a framework for the labour laws creates a vast scope for state intervention which may exacerbate tension in the industrial relations, weakening the capacity for autonomous labour-management relations, and increasing the reliance (especially by the employers) on the state intervention (by police, other law and order authorities, and government and administrative authorities). This will seriously undermines the spirit and principle of autonomous labour- management relations, worsening the prospect for building a basis for mutual recognition, mutual trust, and a healthy industrial relations. The Second Gift Package for the Business Much of the outrage that powered the month-long general strike was sparked off by changes in the labour law which codified into law an number of radical measures for labour market and working hour flexibility. Redundancy Dismissal The labour law that was railroaded through the National Assembly by the ruling party provides legislative provision for 'redundancy dismissal'. The legally specified powers of the employers to dismiss en masse those workers they regard as "redundant" signals a drastic destabilization of employment security. Although 'lay off is not entirely new, as the new legislation, in fact, codifies much of what was already permitted by Supreme Court precedence, will, because its power as a law, have serious structural, social, and psychological ramifications. Before December 26, 1996, lay off was permitted on the basis of the May 1989 Supreme Court decision which provided the justifiable conditions mass retrenchment. It found "the dismissal of workers on the grounds of business reasons" justifiable only when, 1) "there was an urgent management necessity brought about by a danger in maintaining the business without laying off the employees"; 2) the management had undertaken efforts to avoid mass dismissal by means of such efforts as to rationalize the management practice or the work patterns, to suspend new employee recruitment, and to utilize such methods as temporary leave or voluntary retirement; 3) the employees targeted for dismissal were duly selected on the basis of objective and fair criteria; and 4) there was sincere efforts to dialogue with the trade union or the employee representatives prior to the dismissal. The 1989 Supreme Court precedence was overturned by another Supreme Court decision in December 1991 which had the effect of removing all the restrictions on "redundancy dismissal", exposing the workers' job security to the decision of the management. The new law, as demanded by the employers groups and the government, enshrines the 1991 Supreme Court decision into law. The actual law that was 'passed' differs slightly from the original government amendment which states: "When an employer decides to dismiss workers for business reasons there has to be critical business related reasons, such as, continued worsening of business, changes in the work organisation or pattern for improvement in productivity, structural changes due to introduction of new technology and other innovations in technology, and change in the enterprise category." The ruling party claims that it had narrowed the scope of justifiable conditions for mass dismissal. The actual amendment, however, maintains the original conditions except for a change in the wording of the law: "When an employer decides to dismiss workers for business reasons there has to be critical business related reasons, such as, continued worsening of business, structural changes or technology innovation for improvement in productivity, and change in the enterprise category." (27:2 Labour Standard Act) It would not be wrong to see some similarities between the response of the Korean working people and families (who were responsible for the wide spread support for the general strike, recording above 70% support in all public opinion surveys) and the response of their counterparts in most of other countries where companies and governments have succeeded in making greater inroads in the area of 'flexibility'. The threat of dismissal and flexible working hours in Korea, however, has added magnitude and dimension. The 'flexibility' offensive in most European countries is combined with an attack on the so-called 'welfare state'. What is unique about the 'flexibility' crusade in Korea is that it is happening in the absence of any kind of basic 'welfare' protection. The codification of 'redundancy dismissal' or 'lay off' will have a 'catastrophic' impact on the working family. This reflects the reality where much of a family's welfare provisions are linked to company and employment and wage. Korean society lacks a comprehensive minimum social protection and welfare provision. Much of the welfare needs of a family is provided by companies through wage. Most working families are reliant on companies for cheap housing loans, health insurance subsidy, and education subsidy -- to name a few -- which are included in the wage package. In Korea, working people fear that lay off would not just mean loss of a job, but an immediate loss of the house, a sharp rise in medical and education cost, and the very fabric of life. Variable Working Hour System The 'variable working hour system' made a comeback on December 26, 1996. It was first introduced in 1980 by the State Security Legislative Council set up by the military regime of Chun Doo Hwan to be repealed in 1987 as one of the first "repressive laws of the Fifth republic". The new law allows employers to demand employees to work a maximum 56 hours a week -- without overtime rate payment -- as long as the weekly average working hours remain within the legally stipulated 44 hours (42:2 Labour Standard Act). The new law allows the employers to enforce extremely long hours of work for some particular weeks and days of their own choosing without the need to pay the appropriate overtime rate. As noted by employers, advanced industrial countries, such as, U.S., Japan, Germany, and France, allow for "variable working hours". The difference, however, lies in the average real working hours. In all these countries, the average working hours is less than 40 hours a week, in stark contrast to the average of 48.7 hours obtained in Korea. In these countries, a system "variable working hours" was introduced when the average working hour was around 40 hours. For example, the actual average working hour in France is 38.6 hours, and variable working hours is allowed only within the limit of total weekly working hours of 44 hours. There are a number of problems with the new labour which aroused the anger of people. The new working hour system does not coincide with a plan for or a trend of reduction in real or legally stipulated working hours. Furthermore, it does not provide any limit to daily or weekly working hours. These, perhaps, are more technical aspects of the problem. The real problem lies with the dangers of industrial accidents and health problems caused by irregular and extended working hours. And the most important cause for concern is the reduction in wages. The much touted high wage level of Korean workers is, in fact, based on wage boost stemming from overtime pay. Most Korean workers supplement their basic wage by long overtime work. It is necessary * and it has become a common practice -- for Korean workers to work extended ours to obtain extra income needed for their basic livelihood. Therefore, the comparison of wage level between Korean workers and those in the western industrialised countries much take the working hours into consideration. In Korea, therefore, the introduction of 'variable working hour system' is not merely a matter of flexibility, and obtaining the time for leisure activities, as the government rationalises, but a means for greater 'exploitation' without due compensation, giving the companies primitive means of recapturing their lost 'international competitiveness'. From daga at HK.Super.NET Mon Feb 17 12:58:30 1997 From: daga at HK.Super.NET (daga) Date: Mon, 17 Feb 1997 11:58:30 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 360] Dec. 26 Labour Law - Analysis, Part 4 Message-ID: <2.2.16.19970217115155.0947183a@is1.hk.super.net> Korean Confederation of Trade Unions --------------------------------------------------------- The December 26, 1996 Labour Law Amendment: the further violation of the Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (Part 4) 4. Replacement Labour The previous law stipulated, "An employer may not hire, during a period of dispute, a person who is not involved in the dispute nor replace a worker by such a person" (Article 15, Labour Dispute Adjustment Act). The original amendment prepared by the Ministry of Labour and the ad hoc inter-governmental Committee for Industrial Relations Reform provided for the employers to deploy workers from "a different plant of the same business concern" in case there may arise "unrecoverable critical business loss due to a strike". The already drastically curtailed right of collective action was, however, further eroded by the Cabinet meeting, at the request of the various economic ministries. As a result, the new law expands the scope for scab labour to "in case [because of an industrial dispute in a particular company] the operations of the relevant industry is made difficult or major business loss is expected" (Article 43 TU&IRAA). As a result, a final product maker, for example, will now be able to send in replacement labour to a sub-contracting firm if a strike in that (sub-contracting) firm is seen to cause business difficulties for the "parent" firm. 5. Restriction on Industrial Action The government initiated amendment introduces a new provision for a "restriction on industrial action" (TU&IRAA 38) which can lead to unnecessary conflict, litigation, and imprisonment in the course of an industrial dispute. The first such "restriction" concerns 'picketing' of workplaces by unionists to 'persuade' or 'appeal' to non-striking workers to join in the strike or to desist from replacing the striking workers. The new article stipulates that "a dispute activity should not be conducted in a way that obstructs the entry, work, and other regular operations of persons not involved in the dispute activity or other persons who provide labour". Furthermore, striking workers "should not use violence, threat, and other forcible action as a means to appeal or persuade [the non-participating persons] to participate in the dispute activity" (TU&IRAA 38:1). This issue was discussed in depth in the PCIR. The Presidential Commission decided against introducing such a clause because of the dangers of abuse and arbitrary application which can only worsen the industrial relations at the workplaces. The new law introduced by the government, therefore, ignores the PCIR recommendation and creates new areas of conflict due to litigation by the employers and state intervention. It may, in all likelihood, lead to a drastic increase in the imprisonment of unionists for their trade union activities and exercise of the right to strike, as this clause is accompanied by a penalty clause which stipulates a maximum penalty of 3 years imprisonment and/or 30 million Won in fines (TU&IRAA 88:1). Another 'restriction on industrial action' concerns 'protection of production facilities and materials'. The law calls for a ban on industrial action that may affect the "operations needed to avoid damage to production facilities or the deformation or corruption of raw material or product" (TU&IRAA38:2). This adds to the another clause which stipulates restriction on industrial action which "suspends, discontinues or obstructs the normal maintenance and operation of safety facilities installed for the protection of factories, workplaces or any other places of work" (defunct LDAA 13:1, new TU&IRAA 42:2). This issue was also dealt with in depth by the Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform. The PCIR acknowledged that such a 'restriction' may, in some industries such as chemical industry, be tantamount to a blanket ban on industrial action, denying the basic labour right to strike. Based on the consideration, the PCIR reached an agreement not to introduce such a clause. However, the amended law which also sets a penalty of maximum imprisonment of 1 year and/or 10 million Won in fines (TU&IRAA 91:1), will severely limit the collective bargaining rights and the collective action rights. 6. Ban on 'Wildcat Strike' The labour enacted in a commando-style session of the National Assembly introduces a new clause which bans 'unofficial strike', that is, 'wildcat strike'. The new Trade Union and Industrial Relations Adjustment Act stipulates that "members of a trade union shall not conduct a dispute action which is not led by the trade union" (TU&IRAA 37:2). The government initiated amendment is not only unrealistic, but contravene the freedom of association and right of collective action. It is not difficult to envisage the 'breakout' of a strike in a no-union workplace or where there is a so-called 'yellow union' which lacks legitimacy or is deemed not to be representative. The intention of the government is made clear in the stipulation of the penalty for this 'crime'. A person involved in a 'wildcat strike' is liable to a maximum penalty of 3 years imprisonment or 30 million Won in fines (TU&IRAA 89:1). 7. Ban on the Wage for the Duration of a Dispute Activity The December 26 labour law adds a new clause which bans the demand for wage payment for the period of industrial action. It stipulates, an "employer is not allowed to provide wage for the period of dispute action to the employees who did not provide labour due to participation in a dispute action and a trade union is not allowed to demand the payment of wage for the period of a dispute action or conduct dispute action to realise its demand" (TU&IRAA 44). The government initiative to include such a ban is unprecedented and not found in any other country. It is generally accepted that it is a matter for the collective bargaining between the concerned parties to decide, not something that should be dictated and enforced by a law. The law does not only disallow the unions to make a demand on the payment of wage for the period of an industrial action, but also makes illegal for the employers to make such a payment. This stipulation goes beyond the final proposal of the "public interest representatives" presented to the PCIR which only called for a ban on trade union's industrial action demanding wage payment for the period of strike. 8. Federation of Unions The government initiated amendment maintains the strict definition for a 'federation' of trade unions found in the superseded Trade Union Act: "The trade union in the form of a federation as referred to in Paragraph (1) shall refer to a federation by industry members of which are unit trade unions in the same category of industry and a general federation members of which are federations by industry or unit trade unions by industry on a national scale" (TU&IRAA 10:2 and the defunct TUA 13:2). The freedom of association principle signifies that the shape of an organisation, whether as a 'unit trade union' or a 'federation of unions', is a matter for the organisation in question to determine than to be restricted by a law. The law violates the principle of freedom of association but also opens up the possibility of arbitrary abuse in implementation, especially in view of the fluidity of industrial boundaries. The territorial boundary of an organisation is a matter that should be left to the independent decision and arrangements by the organisations concerned. For example, the Hyundai Group Trade Union Federation -- a federation of unions in the Hyundai group of companies, the chaebol conglomerate, active in diverse fields of business, ranging from shipbuilding and automobile to hospital and insurance -- is affiliated to the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions. Its diverse industrial composition or coverage disqualifies it from legal recognition and registration as a 'federation of trade unions' under the amended law. Furthermore, the Ministry of Labour, in considering the application for registration by KCTU, may deny legal recognition because of the inclusion of an 'unlawfully' constituted organisation. It may kindly 'request' and 'advise' the KCTU to remove the 'culprit' organisation from the affiliation list, dictating who can and cannot become a 'member'. The same applies to the membership of the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union (KTU, Chunkyojo) in the KCTU. The new law excludes teachers organisation from the jurisdiction of the trade union related laws. There is no provision within the labour law reform effort of the government concluded in the pre-dawn extraordinary session of the National Assembly, for the recognition of a teachers union under the jurisdiction of the Trade Union and Industrial Relations Adjustment Act. As a result, the inclusion of the KTU/Chunkyojo as a member of the KCTU may be construed as the grounds -- even if all other requirements are met -- for rejecting the KCTU's application for registration. 9. Ban on Sit-Down Strike The government initiated amendment expands the current clause on 'prohibition on acts of violence' (defunct LDAA 13:1) which stipulates that "acts of violence or subversion shall not be allowed as acts of dispute". The new clause adds the "occupation of production and other important facilities or other facilities deemed to be important by a presidential decree" to the types of banned action (TU&IRAA 42:1). A violation of this clause is punishable by a maximum penalty of 3 years imprisonment or 30 million Won in fine (TU&IRAA 89:1). The ban on occupation of production facility, not discussed at all in the PCIR, will make a strike action within the company premise impossible. This clause, in fact, will make all company premises, with possible exception of company sports ground, dining hall, and union office, out of bounds for industrial action. Even such dispute activities as a sit-down strike or work-by-rule or slow down which take place within the 'production facility' may be deemed to be an 'occupation' banned by this clause. 10. The Use of the term "(Trade/Labour) Union" in a Name The Article 7 of the Trade Union and Industrial Relations Adjustment Act (adopting the previously existing provision in the Article 7:2 of the now defunct stipulates that "an organisation that is not recognised by this Act as a trade union shall not be able to use the term 'trade/labour union' in its name." And the penalty for violation of this stipulation was strengthened *from a maximum fine of 200,000 Won to 5 million Won (TU&IRRA 93:1). Korea may be the only country which prohibits the use of a name by law. The Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform originally agreed to repeal this clause (Article 7:2 in the now defunct Trade Union Act) only to be nullified in the absence of KCTU representatives. The maintenance of the ban on the use of the term 'trade union' in some sense straight-jackets the government's position on the issue of teachers union. The government amendment proposes to maintain the current ban on the right of teachers to form and join a 'trade union'. Instead, it had once contemplated to allow teachers to form 'teachers associations' under the jurisdiction of education related laws. Due to the ban on the use of the name, a teachers association -- formed on the basis of the relevant laws -- cannot use '(trade) union' in its name, a possible de facto or detour recognition of a teachers union, a 'face saving measure' for the government which has had to face up to considerable international pressure because of this very issue. From gattwd at corso.ch.planet.gen.nz Mon Feb 24 09:39:58 1997 From: gattwd at corso.ch.planet.gen.nz (Gatt Watchdog) Date: Mon, 24 Feb 1997 12:39:58 +1200 Subject: [asia-apec 361] Getting The Big Picture Message-ID: The Big Picture is a quarterly bulletin on trade and economic issues produced by Aotearoa/New Zealand fair trade coalition GATT Watchdog. The February 1997 issue features articles on: Chile and NAFTA (by Coral Pey of RECHIP, Chile) The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER) (by Wolfgang Rosenberg, former Reader in Economics, Canterbury University) The National/New Zealand First Government and trade/economic policy (by Dr Jane Kelsey, Associate Professor of Law, Auckland University, author of "The New Zealand Experiment") Prison Industries In A Global Free Market (by Radha d'Souza, human rights lawyer) and more... To subscribe to The Big Picture, send NZ $15 (one year's sub) to: GATT Watchdog, PO Box 1905 Christchurch 8015, Aotearoa/New Zealand Please make cheques payable to GATT Watchdog. Fax 64 3 3668035 Email gattwd@corso.ch.planet.gen.nz The Big Picture aims to make the human and environmental impact of global economics and trade intelligible to ordinary people with news, comment and analysis of the rules and systems which keep the corporations getting richer and the rest of us poorer. We identify and link the common causes of poverty and injustice which operate in the world in the guise of "economic growth", and "development": e.g. World Bank/IMF structural adjustment policies, Rogernomics, and GATT/WTO. We look at alternatives. If you are interested in international relations, labour issues, indigenous peoples' rights, women's issues, the environment, APEC, NAFTA, WTO, NZ economic "reforms", or life, the universe and everything, there's something in The Big Picture for you! ===================================================================== GATT Watchdog, Box 1905, Otautahi (Christchurch) 8015, Aotearoa (New Zealand). Ph 64 3 3662803 Fax 64 3 3484763 ===================================================================== From serapina at HK.Super.NET Tue Feb 25 12:51:51 1997 From: serapina at HK.Super.NET (amrc) Date: Tue, 25 Feb 1997 11:51:51 +0800 Subject: [asia-apec 362] Re: Dec. 26 Labour Law - Analysis, Part 3 References: <2.2.16.19970217115151.094764fa@is1.hk.super.net> Message-ID: <331261D7.6F00@hk.super.net> daga wrote: > > Korean Confederation of Trade Unions > --------------------------------------------------------- > > The December 26, 1996 Labour Law Amendment: > the further violation of the Freedom of Association > and Collective Bargaining > > (Part 3) > > 6. Compulsory Arbitration > > The Labour Minister may refer an industrial dispute to an > "emergency adjustment" by the Central Labour Relations > Commission > > if acts of dispute are related to business of public interest, or it is > of > such a scope or character that there exists a danger which might > substantially impair the nation's economy or endanger the daily life of > the general public (LDAA 40, TU&IRAA 76). > > Once a "dispute" is referred to an "emergency adjustment", the > parties to the dispute must > > "immediately suspend any act of dispute" and parties are banned from > undertaking any form of dispute activities for thirty days". (TU&IRAA 77; > > this is a change from the current law which calls for no industrial > action > for twenty days [LDAA 41].) > > If the Central Labour Relations Commission fails to arrive at an > "adjustment" of a dispute, it can decide to refer the dispute to an > "arbitration". While, logically, it is possible to expect the Central > Labour Relations Commission to decide against "recommending" a > "compulsory arbitration", it is widely accepted that a failure to reach a > settlement in "emergency adjustment" leads automatically to a > "compulsory arbitration". The "arbitration" will then be undertaken by > the "Central Labour Relations Commission" (TU&IRAA 79). > > While 'emergency adjustment' -- per se -- can be regarded as a > significant institutional mechanism for 'mediation' and 'conciliation', it > is held in deep distrust because it, in reality, functions as a trip-wire > trigger for "compulsory arbitration" which automatically and > coercively suspend all freedom and right of collective bargaining and > collective action. > > "Compulsory arbitration" is defined in the Articles 30 to 39 of the > 'old' LDAA and the Articles 62 to 70 of the new TU & IRAA. An > "arbitration" can be activated in three different cases: a joint request > by both parties in an industrial dispute, a request by one of the parties > in accordance with the provisions of the collective agreement, and a > decision by the Labour Relations Commission upon the demand of > the administrative authority or ex officio with respect to public > enterprise (LDAA 30). The new TU & IRAA differs from the LDAA only > on the third condition. It states: the Labour Relations Commission > shall arbitrate "when the Labour Relations Commission, on the basis > of the recommendation of a 'Special Adjustment Committee' decided > to refer a dispute to arbitration with respect to essential public > enterprise" (TU&IRAA 62:3). > > Once a dispute is referred to "compulsory arbitration" all parties > to an industrial dispute is compelled to suspend all forms dispute for > 15 days (TU&IRAA 63). Any industrial action undertaken after the > referral to a "compulsory arbitration" is illegal. An "award of > arbitration" has "the same effect as that of a collective agreement" > (TU&IRAA 70:2). A party can appeal the decision of a Local Labour > Relations Commission to the Central Labour Relations Commission > within 10 days of the original decision, and then begin an > administrative suit within 15 days of the review decision, if it > considers that an award of arbitration violates a law or is an act > beyond the authority of the Commission (TU&IRAA 69). However, > "The effect of an award of arbitration or decision after review > rendered by a Labour Relations Commission shall not be suspended > by an application for review to the Central Labour Relations > Commission or bringing an administrative suit" (TU&IRAA70:1). > > The problem with the system and practice of "compulsory > arbitration" is that it is widely abused by the "administrative authority" > to suspend the basic labour rights based on very arbitrary or one-side > decision. The debate in the Presidential Commission on Industrial > Relations Reform (PCIR) concentrated on reducing the extent of > arbitrariness and the scope of enterprises that may be subject to > "compulsory arbitration". > > The amended law, on surface, alleviates some of the concern by > introducing the "essential public enterprise" sub-category. However, > the amended law nullifies the spirit of "essential public enterprise" > concept by including wide ranging variety of enterprises in the list. > Furthermore, the absence of a criterion and mechanism for > differentiating between the diverse individual workplaces within a type > of enterprise, and for differentiating the various sections within a > workplace on the degree of "essentialness" or importance leaves the > system open to the same kind of abuse and arbitrariness of the "old" > system. In essence, the government amendment lacks any sign of > having taken effort to balance the need to guarantee the basic labour > rights and the essential need of general population. > > 7. Administrative Interference in Internal Union Affairs > > The newly amended law maintains all of the provisions in the > superseded Trade Union Act which allows government to intervene in > the internal affairs of a trade union. ILO has, in fact called on the > Korean government to remove these provisions so that unions can > enjoy full freedom of association. The Presidential Commission on > Industrial Relations Reform has also recommended the government > to repeal these provisions, especially the provisions which give the > Ministry of Labour a power to demand unions to submit "financial > statements, minutes of meetings, and other relevant documents" in > order to 'mediate', 'supervise', or 'investigate' as cases arise. > > However, these provisions are maintained in the new law (TUIRAA > 27). Furthermore, the penalty for a failure to abide by this law is > increased from 'three month imprisonment or 200,000 Won in fines' > to '5 million Won in fines'. > > New Restriction and Violations of Trade Union Rights > > The newly amended labour law, rather than moving closer to > international labour standards as specified in the ILO Conventions, > introduces new restrictions on trade union rights, adding to the > existing violations of freedom of association examined by the > International Labour Organisation. > > 1. Membership Eligibility > > The new law also regresses on the eligibility of union membership. > In the definition of a trade union, a trade union may not be recognised > as a trade union if it "allows a person who is not a worker to be a > member" (TU&IRAA 2:3d) while a 'worker' is defined as one "who > lives on a wage, salary, or any other income similar thereto > regardless of his occupation" (TU&IRAA 2:1). While the definition > leaves open whether the membership base of a union must be within > the boundary of a single company (business concern), it creates > important problems for the status of 'dismissed workers" (and > possibly unemployed workers). > > The Paragraph 3d of the Article 2 which stipulates one of the > conditions for disqualifying a trade union states, > > "any dismissed worker who has applied to the Labour Relations > Commission for relief of unfair labour practice shall not be interpreted > as non-worker until the decision of the review [appeals hearing] by the > Central Labour Relations Commission is made." > > Under the superseded law, a dismissed worker could maintain > his/her union membership until the Supreme Court (the highest court > of the land) brings down a verdict on the validity of the dismissal. The > 'eligibility' clause reflects the anachronism of 'enterprise' unionism > enforced by the law to limit the organisational boundary of a union to > a company. > > Who can become a member of a union is an issue that should be > left to the decision of the union itself through its constitution and > rules. > This is the essence of the principle of freedom of association. In the > same spirit, the union membership eligibility of a dismissed worker > should be left to the decision and the rules of the union. The "public > interest representatives" in the Presidential Commission on Industrial > Relations Reform proposed to repeal this particular clause so that > eligibility of membership in an industrial union or a regional union can > be determined by the constitution and rules of the union in question. > The government initiated amendment, however, ignores the > recommendation of the "public interest representatives" and takes a > radical backward step from the previous law and practice by calling > for an even greater restriction on freedom of association. > > 2. Wage Payment for Full-time Union Officers > > The new labour law introduces a new provision on the full-time > union officers. The Article 24 of the Trade Union and Industrial > Relations Adjustment Act states: > > I. An employee, if stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement > or agreed to by the employer, can engage in the work and > activities of union on full-time basis without providing labour as > required by employment contract. > II. The person(s) engaged in union work full-time as specified in the > above paragraph ("full-time union staff") shall not receive any kind > of remuneration or wage from the employer for the period of > his/her term as full-time union staff. > > The draft bill, then, goes on to define the practice of "providing wage > to a full-time union officer" as an "unfair labour practice" on the part > of the employer (TU&IRRA 81d). > > The Korean government, in its amendment, introduces a > legislative regulation not found in any other country in the world. It > runs contrary to the ILO recommendation that employers should > provide wage, allowance, and leave to workers representatives at the > company level. The new law, in stipulating for a gradual progress > towards the total termination of the current practice of wage payment > to full-time union officers by the end of year 2001, declares that > "trade unions must endeavour to achieve financial independence". > The government is "exploiting" the principle of financial > independence, turning it into a weapons against the trade union > movement. This will become a devastating weapon in the current > situation where unions in companies with less than 100 employees > make up 63% of all the unions in Korea. The impact of this law will be > crippling as the monthly financial resources of most of these unions > are less than one million Won. > > The Korean government's legislative initiative willfully exploits > that current enterprise union system. As all 'unit' unions in Korea are > enterprise level unions, the trade union movement is unable to > accumulate a substantial financial base. Each enterprise union is an > integral union with its own president and other full-time officers. They > are in no way identical to "shopstewards" or organisers or officers > found in the 'industrial' unions of other countries. There is no denying > that organisers and full-time officers 'employed' by industrial unions > should be fully supported by the unions themselves. This principle, > however, cannot apply to the specific Korean situation where an > individual union at each enterprise has to finance all its activities from > its circumscribed membership dues. The new legislative stipulation, > therefore, can only be perceived as an attempt to emasculate the > trade union movement before it transforms itself into a powerful > industrial structure. > > 3. Right of Ratification > > Under the previous law, a union, following its constitution and > rules, can put a 'provisional' collective bargaining agreement arrived > through negotiations with the employer to a vote of the general > meeting of the union membership. This is similar to the 'ratification' > procedure that a government may be required to undertake to adopt a > binding international agreement or treaty. The previous legislative > arrangement does not stipulate a ratification process; nor does it > specifically 'outlaw' such a process. The ratification process is a > democratic procedure that strengthens the accountability of a union > leadership and the democratic participation of the membership in the > union's decision making. As such it is a matter that should be left to > the constitution and the rules of the individual union. > > The new law, however, paves the way for an automatic adoption > of a legally binding CBA based on the agreement between the > employers and a handful of union officers. It says: "the representative > of a union has the right to negotiate and adopt a collective bargaining > agreement on behalf of the union or the members" (TU&IRAA 29:1). > While the new legislation does not enforce such an arrangement, it > does introduce a legal basis for a judicial or administrative > intervention against a popular rejection of an agreement between the > union officer corps and the employer. > > This points to a worst case scenario of a collusion between the > elected union leaders and employers. Such a situation may exist in > weak or nascent unions or in situation where 'yellow unionism' is > prevalent, which could be said to have been the case in Korea for a > long time. The internal decision making procedure such as this, > therefore, is a matter that should be left to the members and the > organisation itself to decide. It is a matter that can only be decided by > the members themselves by balancing the need for democracy and > efficiency as they perceive. From mtachiba at jca.or.jp Wed Feb 26 10:54:34 1997 From: mtachiba at jca.or.jp (TACHIBANA Masahiko) Date: Wed, 26 Feb 1997 10:54:34 +0900 Subject: [asia-apec 363] FWD: The Final Round -- 4th Wave General Strike Message-ID: <9702260152.AA28044@brahman.phy.saitama-u.ac.jp> Following is the article originally sent from KCTU-International to DAGA, which has been failed when reposted to asia-apec. TACHIBANA Masahiko, one of the owner-asia-apec@mail.jca.or.jp * * * * * > To: asia-apec@jca.or.jp > From: "KCTU-International" (by way of daga ) > Subject: The Final Round -- 4th Wave General Strike KOREAN CONFEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS --------------------------------------------------------- Struggle for Labour Law Reforms Campaign News XXIII February 25, 1997 The Final Round Recognise the Teachers' Union Stop Mass Redundancy Dismissal Lift the Ban on Paid Full-time Union Officers End Trade Union Repression Strike Action to Resume on February 26 The Central Committee of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, on February 25, 1997, resolved to embark on the fourth wave of the general strike to bring the nation-wide mass action that began the day after Christmas last year to a successful conclusion. The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions will resume strike action on December 26 to culminate in an all out strike of all the members on February 28. The decision came as the political parties, both the ruling party and opposition parties, continue to vacillate over the key issues of the labour law. The National Assembly, reopened for an extraordinary session on February 17, 1997, began the proceedings for the re-amendment of the railroaded labour laws to be completed by the end of February before the December 26 version comes into effect. It follows the retreat by the Kim Young Sam government, which on January 21, 1997, conceded, in the face of a month-long general strike, to a rewrite of the much-denounced labour laws. The Ten Point Demand The Central Committee decision came after the February 22 announcement of 10 core demands for labour law amendment. Following a meeting of the expanded executive committee, president Kwon Young-kil proclaimed that the KCTU was prepared to accept a moratorium on legal recognition if the following 10 demands were met in the labour laws amendment: * guarantee of the freedom of association for teachers and government employees * the annulment of the ban on payment of wage for full-time union officers at company level * the restoration of union membership eligibility for dismissed workers (until the decision of the Supreme Court) * the complete repeal of the prohibition on third party intervention * the reinstitution of the ban on replacement of striking workers from out side the plant under dispute * the revocation of the ban on remuneration for the period of strike * the cancellation of the ban on industrial action within production facilities * the narrowing of the scope of 'essential services' which is subject to compulsory arbitration * the withdrawal of the legal provisions for mass redundancy dismissal * limitation of the variable working hours system to full work day for alternate Saturdays The decision signifies a delay in the legal recognition for the KCTU the nerve-end of decade-long campaign for labour law reform and the subject of the ardent desire of the democratic trade union movement. The KCTU decision is based on two reasons. The dramatic turn around was aimed at pressuring the political parties to make an earnest commitment to the removal of the pernicious provisions in the December 26 labour laws which would straight-jacket trade union activities and negate the effect and power of collective industrial action. The surprise decision also reflects the KCTU's commitment to win a legal recognition for the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union (Chunkyojo, KTU), a historic partner in the birth and development of the democratic trade union movement. The KCTU decision is targeted at the unwillingness of the government and political parties in the National Assembly to engage in a serious and sincere effort to guarantee trade union rights. The Kim Young Sam government and the political parties, while compelled by the force of the general strike to make a commitment for re-amendment, remain cowered by the fear of straying out of the favour of the big business groups. Furthermore, they remain uncommitted to the principle of freedom of association for teachers and government employees from the fear of running against the powerful private school owners lobby and bureaucracy. Their attitude, in a more long term perspective, also reflects their concern over the potential development of the trade union movement as a potent political force which could challenge their monopoly on political and policy affairs. The Political Procrastination The National Assembly proceedings for the re-write of the labour laws began with two public hearings by the Standing Committee on Environment and Labour. President Kwon Young-kil appearing before the first public hearing, on February 19, dealing with general trade union rights issues, (attended by the representatives of International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Education International, and Public Services International) highlighted the freedom of association for teachers and government employees as the central demand. He also presented documentation on paid full-time union officers/representatives at company levels and remuneration during the strike period in the OECD member countries to counter the Korean government's argument that such practices are unique to Korea. The ruling party remained silent during the initial period of the National Assembly proceedings. It maintained that the December 26 action represented its best effort and it was up to the opposition parties to bring forward proposals for change for negotiation. The ruling party's attitude forced the opposition parties under an unenviable spot light. In response, the two major opposition parties the National Congress for New Politics led by Kim Dae Jung and the United Liberal Democrats led by Kim Jong Pil on February 24 finally produced a single set of proposals for change in the labour laws. The opposition agenda proposes, on the one hand, to lift the ban on union pluralism at the federation and national centre level immediately while maintaining the moratorium on the enterprise level. On the other hand, they remain silent on the issue of unionisation for teachers and government employees. On the redundancy dismissal -- layoff issue, the two opposition political parties proposed to introduce a new law to regulate mass dismissals for managerial reasons. Their proposed arrangement reflects their wish to appease the powerful big business groups while not ignoring the anger and resistance of the working people. While the opposition parties have produced a set of proposals which appear to approximate the trade union demands, they have failed to allay the wide-spread suspicion that they are only going through the motions without the commitment to uphold internationally recognised standards and fight off the ruling party's intransigence. Their efforts, it is interpreted, are aimed at coming out of the current labour law conjuncture unscathed. They hope to achieve this goal, it is said, by putting up, on the one hand, an appearance of representing the aspiration of the working people, and by, on the other hand, appeasing the powerful business groups in substance by not putting up an earnest fight to defend their pronounced positions. The General Strike: the aspiration and struggle of the working people The Central Committee decision to embark on the fourth wave of general strike comes at a time when the fate of the labour law remains in balance. The Central Committee streamlined the KCTU demands to sharpen the focus of the general strike. It called for: * a legal recognition for the teachers union * a complete withdrawal of the legislative provisions for layoff * the revocation of the ban on payment of wage to full-time union officers/representatives at the company level, and * an end to the reprisals against unionists for their just actions of resistance against the repressive labour laws. The fourth wave general strike will begin on February 26 by a mass protest rally in Seoul by union shopstewards in front of the ruling party office. The rallyists will, then, join the hundreds of teachers conducting a sit-in protest at the offices of the two opposition parties. On the second day, February 27, the strike action will escalate to a strike involving all of the shopstewards at company level, to be followed by mass protest rallies at the major urban centres throughout the country. The fourth general strike will culminate on February 28 with a full general strike bringing all KCTU members out to streets. The Central Committee has not decided on the length of the full general strike, leaving it to be determined in accordance with the changing situation. The fourth wave general strike, taking place at the critical moment in the parliamentary proceedings, will demonstrate the determination of the working people not to leave their destiny in the hands of short-sighted politicians but to win their rights and welfare through struggle. From ppi at qinet.net Wed Feb 26 12:05:42 1997 From: ppi at qinet.net (ppi) Date: Wed, 26 Feb 1997 11:05:42 +0800 Subject: [asia-apec 364] Re: Dec. 26 Labour Law - Analysis, Part 3 Message-ID: Hello, Could you please provide us part 1 and part 2 of the dec. 26 labour law - analysis? Thanks in advance, PPI/MPFA ---------- > From: amrc > To: h.y.cho@lancaster.ac.uk > Cc: asia-apec@jca.or.jp > Subject: [asia-apec 362] Re: Dec. 26 Labour Law - Analysis, Part 3 > Date: Tuesday, February 25, 1997 11:51 AM > > daga wrote: > > > > Korean Confederation of Trade Unions > > --------------------------------------------------------- > > > > The December 26, 1996 Labour Law Amendment: > > the further violation of the Freedom of Association > > and Collective Bargaining > > > > (Part 3) > > > > 6. Compulsory Arbitration > > > > The Labour Minister may refer an industrial dispute to an > > "emergency adjustment" by the Central Labour Relations > > Commission > > > > if acts of dispute are related to business of public interest, or it is > > of > > such a scope or character that there exists a danger which might > > substantially impair the nation's economy or endanger the daily life of > > the general public (LDAA 40, TU&IRAA 76). > > > > Once a "dispute" is referred to an "emergency adjustment", the > > parties to the dispute must > > > > "immediately suspend any act of dispute" and parties are banned from > > undertaking any form of dispute activities for thirty days". (TU&IRAA 77; > > > > this is a change from the current law which calls for no industrial > > action > > for twenty days [LDAA 41].) > > > > If the Central Labour Relations Commission fails to arrive at an > > "adjustment" of a dispute, it can decide to refer the dispute to an > > "arbitration". While, logically, it is possible to expect the Central > > Labour Relations Commission to decide against "recommending" a > > "compulsory arbitration", it is widely accepted that a failure to reach a > > settlement in "emergency adjustment" leads automatically to a > > "compulsory arbitration". The "arbitration" will then be undertaken by > > the "Central Labour Relations Commission" (TU&IRAA 79). > > > > While 'emergency adjustment' -- per se -- can be regarded as a > > significant institutional mechanism for 'mediation' and 'conciliation', it > > is held in deep distrust because it, in reality, functions as a trip-wire > > trigger for "compulsory arbitration" which automatically and > > coercively suspend all freedom and right of collective bargaining and > > collective action. > > > > "Compulsory arbitration" is defined in the Articles 30 to 39 of the > > 'old' LDAA and the Articles 62 to 70 of the new TU & IRAA. An > > "arbitration" can be activated in three different cases: a joint request > > by both parties in an industrial dispute, a request by one of the parties > > in accordance with the provisions of the collective agreement, and a > > decision by the Labour Relations Commission upon the demand of > > the administrative authority or ex officio with respect to public > > enterprise (LDAA 30). The new TU & IRAA differs from the LDAA only > > on the third condition. It states: the Labour Relations Commission > > shall arbitrate "when the Labour Relations Commission, on the basis > > of the recommendation of a 'Special Adjustment Committee' decided > > to refer a dispute to arbitration with respect to essential public > > enterprise" (TU&IRAA 62:3). > > > > Once a dispute is referred to "compulsory arbitration" all parties > > to an industrial dispute is compelled to suspend all forms dispute for > > 15 days (TU&IRAA 63). Any industrial action undertaken after the > > referral to a "compulsory arbitration" is illegal. An "award of > > arbitration" has "the same effect as that of a collective agreement" > > (TU&IRAA 70:2). A party can appeal the decision of a Local Labour > > Relations Commission to the Central Labour Relations Commission > > within 10 days of the original decision, and then begin an > > administrative suit within 15 days of the review decision, if it > > considers that an award of arbitration violates a law or is an act > > beyond the authority of the Commission (TU&IRAA 69). However, > > "The effect of an award of arbitration or decision after review > > rendered by a Labour Relations Commission shall not be suspended > > by an application for review to the Central Labour Relations > > Commission or bringing an administrative suit" (TU&IRAA70:1). > > > > The problem with the system and practice of "compulsory > > arbitration" is that it is widely abused by the "administrative authority" > > to suspend the basic labour rights based on very arbitrary or one-side > > decision. The debate in the Presidential Commission on Industrial > > Relations Reform (PCIR) concentrated on reducing the extent of > > arbitrariness and the scope of enterprises that may be subject to > > "compulsory arbitration". > > > > The amended law, on surface, alleviates some of the concern by > > introducing the "essential public enterprise" sub-category. However, > > the amended law nullifies the spirit of "essential public enterprise" > > concept by including wide ranging variety of enterprises in the list. > > Furthermore, the absence of a criterion and mechanism for > > differentiating between the diverse individual workplaces within a type > > of enterprise, and for differentiating the various sections within a > > workplace on the degree of "essentialness" or importance leaves the > > system open to the same kind of abuse and arbitrariness of the "old" > > system. In essence, the government amendment lacks any sign of > > having taken effort to balance the need to guarantee the basic labour > > rights and the essential need of general population. > > > > 7. Administrative Interference in Internal Union Affairs > > > > The newly amended law maintains all of the provisions in the > > superseded Trade Union Act which allows government to intervene in > > the internal affairs of a trade union. ILO has, in fact called on the > > Korean government to remove these provisions so that unions can > > enjoy full freedom of association. The Presidential Commission on > > Industrial Relations Reform has also recommended the government > > to repeal these provisions, especially the provisions which give the > > Ministry of Labour a power to demand unions to submit "financial > > statements, minutes of meetings, and other relevant documents" in > > order to 'mediate', 'supervise', or 'investigate' as cases arise. > > > > However, these provisions are maintained in the new law (TUIRAA > > 27). Furthermore, the penalty for a failure to abide by this law is > > increased from 'three month imprisonment or 200,000 Won in fines' > > to '5 million Won in fines'. > > > > New Restriction and Violations of Trade Union Rights > > > > The newly amended labour law, rather than moving closer to > > international labour standards as specified in the ILO Conventions, > > introduces new restrictions on trade union rights, adding to the > > existing violations of freedom of association examined by the > > International Labour Organisation. > > > > 1. Membership Eligibility > > > > The new law also regresses on the eligibility of union membership. > > In the definition of a trade union, a trade union may not be recognised > > as a trade union if it "allows a person who is not a worker to be a > > member" (TU&IRAA 2:3d) while a 'worker' is defined as one "who > > lives on a wage, salary, or any other income similar thereto > > regardless of his occupation" (TU&IRAA 2:1). While the definition > > leaves open whether the membership base of a union must be within > > the boundary of a single company (business concern), it creates > > important problems for the status of 'dismissed workers" (and > > possibly unemployed workers). > > > > The Paragraph 3d of the Article 2 which stipulates one of the > > conditions for disqualifying a trade union states, > > > > "any dismissed worker who has applied to the Labour Relations > > Commission for relief of unfair labour practice shall not be interpreted > > as non-worker until the decision of the review [appeals hearing] by the > > Central Labour Relations Commission is made." > > > > Under the superseded law, a dismissed worker could maintain > > his/her union membership until the Supreme Court (the highest court > > of the land) brings down a verdict on the validity of the dismissal. The > > 'eligibility' clause reflects the anachronism of 'enterprise' unionism > > enforced by the law to limit the organisational boundary of a union to > > a company. > > > > Who can become a member of a union is an issue that should be > > left to the decision of the union itself through its constitution and > > rules. > > This is the essence of the principle of freedom of association. In the > > same spirit, the union membership eligibility of a dismissed worker > > should be left to the decision and the rules of the union. The "public > > interest representatives" in the Presidential Commission on Industrial > > Relations Reform proposed to repeal this particular clause so that > > eligibility of membership in an industrial union or a regional union can > > be determined by the constitution and rules of the union in question. > > The government initiated amendment, however, ignores the > > recommendation of the "public interest representatives" and takes a > > radical backward step from the previous law and practice by calling > > for an even greater restriction on freedom of association. > > > > 2. Wage Payment for Full-time Union Officers > > > > The new labour law introduces a new provision on the full-time > > union officers. The Article 24 of the Trade Union and Industrial > > Relations Adjustment Act states: > > > > I. An employee, if stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement > > or agreed to by the employer, can engage in the work and > > activities of union on full-time basis without providing labour as > > required by employment contract. > > II. The person(s) engaged in union work full-time as specified in the > > above paragraph ("full-time union staff") shall not receive any kind > > of remuneration or wage from the employer for the period of > > his/her term as full-time union staff. > > > > The draft bill, then, goes on to define the practice of "providing wage > > to a full-time union officer" as an "unfair labour practice" on the part > > of the employer (TU&IRRA 81d). > > > > The Korean government, in its amendment, introduces a > > legislative regulation not found in any other country in the world. It > > runs contrary to the ILO recommendation that employers should > > provide wage, allowance, and leave to workers representatives at the > > company level. The new law, in stipulating for a gradual progress > > towards the total termination of the current practice of wage payment > > to full-time union officers by the end of year 2001, declares that > > "trade unions must endeavour to achieve financial independence". > > The government is "exploiting" the principle of financial > > independence, turning it into a weapons against the trade union > > movement. This will become a devastating weapon in the current > > situation where unions in companies with less than 100 employees > > make up 63% of all the unions in Korea. The impact of this law will be > > crippling as the monthly financial resources of most of these unions > > are less than one million Won. > > > > The Korean government's legislative initiative willfully exploits > > that current enterprise union system. As all 'unit' unions in Korea are > > enterprise level unions, the trade union movement is unable to > > accumulate a substantial financial base. Each enterprise union is an > > integral union with its own president and other full-time officers. They > > are in no way identical to "shopstewards" or organisers or officers > > found in the 'industrial' unions of other countries. There is no denying > > that organisers and full-time officers 'employed' by industrial unions > > should be fully supported by the unions themselves. This principle, > > however, cannot apply to the specific Korean situation where an > > individual union at each enterprise has to finance all its activities from > > its circumscribed membership dues. The new legislative stipulation, > > therefore, can only be perceived as an attempt to emasculate the > > trade union movement before it transforms itself into a powerful > > industrial structure. > > > > 3. Right of Ratification > > > > Under the previous law, a union, following its constitution and > > rules, can put a 'provisional' collective bargaining agreement arrived > > through negotiations with the employer to a vote of the general > > meeting of the union membership. This is similar to the 'ratification' > > procedure that a government may be required to undertake to adopt a > > binding international agreement or treaty. The previous legislative > > arrangement does not stipulate a ratification process; nor does it > > specifically 'outlaw' such a process. The ratification process is a > > democratic procedure that strengthens the accountability of a union > > leadership and the democratic participation of the membership in the > > union's decision making. As such it is a matter that should be left to > > the constitution and the rules of the individual union. > > > > The new law, however, paves the way for an automatic adoption > > of a legally binding CBA based on the agreement between the > > employers and a handful of union officers. It says: "the representative > > of a union has the right to negotiate and adopt a collective bargaining > > agreement on behalf of the union or the members" (TU&IRAA 29:1). > > While the new legislation does not enforce such an arrangement, it > > does introduce a legal basis for a judicial or administrative > > intervention against a popular rejection of an agreement between the > > union officer corps and the employer. > > > > This points to a worst case scenario of a collusion between the > > elected union leaders and employers. Such a situation may exist in > > weak or nascent unions or in situation where 'yellow unionism' is > > prevalent, which could be said to have been the case in Korea for a > > long time. The internal decision making procedure such as this, > > therefore, is a matter that should be left to the members and the > > organisation itself to decide. It is a matter that can only be decided by > > the members themselves by balancing the need for democracy and > > efficiency as they perceive. From amrc at HK.Super.NET Thu Feb 27 14:26:26 1997 From: amrc at HK.Super.NET (AMRC) Date: Thu, 27 Feb 1997 13:26:26 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 365] Re: Dec. 26 Labour Law - Analysis, Part 3 Message-ID: <199702270526.NAA12286@hk.super.net> Dear friend, I don't knwo who are you, but suppose you are friend of Jo Hee youn brother. Whatever you want to know the situation of Korean strike, You can access the homepage of KCTU and e-mail - kctu@chollian.dacom.co.kr Best wishes Serapina Cha Mi-kyung >> From: amrc >> To: h.y.cho@lancaster.ac.uk >> Cc: asia-apec@jca.or.jp >> Subject: [asia-apec 362] Re: Dec. 26 Labour Law - Analysis, Part 3 >> Date: Tuesday, February 25, 1997 11:51 AM >> >> daga wrote: >> > >> > Korean Confederation of Trade Unions >> > --------------------------------------------------------- >> > >> > The December 26, 1996 Labour Law Amendment: >> > the further violation of the Freedom of Association >> > and Collective Bargaining >> > >> > (Part 3) >> > >> > 6. Compulsory Arbitration >> > >> > The Labour Minister may refer an industrial dispute to an >> > "emergency adjustment" by the Central Labour Relations >> > Commission >> > >> > if acts of dispute are related to business of public interest, or it >is >> > of >> > such a scope or character that there exists a danger which might >> > substantially impair the nation's economy or endanger the daily life >of >> > the general public (LDAA 40, TU&IRAA 76). >> > >> > Once a "dispute" is referred to an "emergency adjustment", the >> > parties to the dispute must >> > >> > "immediately suspend any act of dispute" and parties are banned from >> > undertaking any form of dispute activities for thirty days". (TU&IRAA >77; >> > >> > this is a change from the current law which calls for no industrial >> > action >> > for twenty days [LDAA 41].) >> > >> > If the Central Labour Relations Commission fails to arrive at an >> > "adjustment" of a dispute, it can decide to refer the dispute to an >> > "arbitration". While, logically, it is possible to expect the Central >> > Labour Relations Commission to decide against "recommending" a >> > "compulsory arbitration", it is widely accepted that a failure to reach >a >> > settlement in "emergency adjustment" leads automatically to a >> > "compulsory arbitration". The "arbitration" will then be undertaken by >> > the "Central Labour Relations Commission" (TU&IRAA 79). >> > >> > While 'emergency adjustment' -- per se -- can be regarded as a >> > significant institutional mechanism for 'mediation' and 'conciliation', >it >> > is held in deep distrust because it, in reality, functions as a >trip-wire >> > trigger for "compulsory arbitration" which automatically and >> > coercively suspend all freedom and right of collective bargaining and >> > collective action. >> > >> > "Compulsory arbitration" is defined in the Articles 30 to 39 of the >> > 'old' LDAA and the Articles 62 to 70 of the new TU & IRAA. An >> > "arbitration" can be activated in three different cases: a joint >request >> > by both parties in an industrial dispute, a request by one of the >parties >> > in accordance with the provisions of the collective agreement, and a >> > decision by the Labour Relations Commission upon the demand of >> > the administrative authority or ex officio with respect to public >> > enterprise (LDAA 30). The new TU & IRAA differs from the LDAA only >> > on the third condition. It states: the Labour Relations Commission >> > shall arbitrate "when the Labour Relations Commission, on the basis >> > of the recommendation of a 'Special Adjustment Committee' decided >> > to refer a dispute to arbitration with respect to essential public >> > enterprise" (TU&IRAA 62:3). >> > >> > Once a dispute is referred to "compulsory arbitration" all parties >> > to an industrial dispute is compelled to suspend all forms dispute for >> > 15 days (TU&IRAA 63). Any industrial action undertaken after the >> > referral to a "compulsory arbitration" is illegal. An "award of >> > arbitration" has "the same effect as that of a collective agreement" >> > (TU&IRAA 70:2). A party can appeal the decision of a Local Labour >> > Relations Commission to the Central Labour Relations Commission >> > within 10 days of the original decision, and then begin an >> > administrative suit within 15 days of the review decision, if it >> > considers that an award of arbitration violates a law or is an act >> > beyond the authority of the Commission (TU&IRAA 69). However, >> > "The effect of an award of arbitration or decision after review >> > rendered by a Labour Relations Commission shall not be suspended >> > by an application for review to the Central Labour Relations >> > Commission or bringing an administrative suit" (TU&IRAA70:1). >> > >> > The problem with the system and practice of "compulsory >> > arbitration" is that it is widely abused by the "administrative >authority" >> > to suspend the basic labour rights based on very arbitrary or one-side >> > decision. The debate in the Presidential Commission on Industrial >> > Relations Reform (PCIR) concentrated on reducing the extent of >> > arbitrariness and the scope of enterprises that may be subject to >> > "compulsory arbitration". >> > >> > The amended law, on surface, alleviates some of the concern by >> > introducing the "essential public enterprise" sub-category. However, >> > the amended law nullifies the spirit of "essential public enterprise" >> > concept by including wide ranging variety of enterprises in the list. >> > Furthermore, the absence of a criterion and mechanism for >> > differentiating between the diverse individual workplaces within a type >> > of enterprise, and for differentiating the various sections within a >> > workplace on the degree of "essentialness" or importance leaves the >> > system open to the same kind of abuse and arbitrariness of the "old" >> > system. In essence, the government amendment lacks any sign of >> > having taken effort to balance the need to guarantee the basic labour >> > rights and the essential need of general population. >> > >> > 7. Administrative Interference in Internal Union Affairs >> > >> > The newly amended law maintains all of the provisions in the >> > superseded Trade Union Act which allows government to intervene in >> > the internal affairs of a trade union. ILO has, in fact called on the >> > Korean government to remove these provisions so that unions can >> > enjoy full freedom of association. The Presidential Commission on >> > Industrial Relations Reform has also recommended the government >> > to repeal these provisions, especially the provisions which give the >> > Ministry of Labour a power to demand unions to submit "financial >> > statements, minutes of meetings, and other relevant documents" in >> > order to 'mediate', 'supervise', or 'investigate' as cases arise. >> > >> > However, these provisions are maintained in the new law (TUIRAA >> > 27). Furthermore, the penalty for a failure to abide by this law is >> > increased from 'three month imprisonment or 200,000 Won in fines' >> > to '5 million Won in fines'. >> > >> > New Restriction and Violations of Trade Union Rights >> > >> > The newly amended labour law, rather than moving closer to >> > international labour standards as specified in the ILO Conventions, >> > introduces new restrictions on trade union rights, adding to the >> > existing violations of freedom of association examined by the >> > International Labour Organisation. >> > >> > 1. Membership Eligibility >> > >> > The new law also regresses on the eligibility of union membership. >> > In the definition of a trade union, a trade union may not be recognised >> > as a trade union if it "allows a person who is not a worker to be a >> > member" (TU&IRAA 2:3d) while a 'worker' is defined as one "who >> > lives on a wage, salary, or any other income similar thereto >> > regardless of his occupation" (TU&IRAA 2:1). While the definition >> > leaves open whether the membership base of a union must be within >> > the boundary of a single company (business concern), it creates >> > important problems for the status of 'dismissed workers" (and >> > possibly unemployed workers). >> > >> > The Paragraph 3d of the Article 2 which stipulates one of the >> > conditions for disqualifying a trade union states, >> > >> > "any dismissed worker who has applied to the Labour Relations >> > Commission for relief of unfair labour practice shall not be >interpreted >> > as non-worker until the decision of the review [appeals hearing] by >the >> > Central Labour Relations Commission is made." >> > >> > Under the superseded law, a dismissed worker could maintain >> > his/her union membership until the Supreme Court (the highest court >> > of the land) brings down a verdict on the validity of the dismissal. >The >> > 'eligibility' clause reflects the anachronism of 'enterprise' unionism >> > enforced by the law to limit the organisational boundary of a union to >> > a company. >> > >> > Who can become a member of a union is an issue that should be >> > left to the decision of the union itself through its constitution and >> > rules. >> > This is the essence of the principle of freedom of association. In the >> > same spirit, the union membership eligibility of a dismissed worker >> > should be left to the decision and the rules of the union. The "public >> > interest representatives" in the Presidential Commission on Industrial >> > Relations Reform proposed to repeal this particular clause so that >> > eligibility of membership in an industrial union or a regional union >can >> > be determined by the constitution and rules of the union in question. >> > The government initiated amendment, however, ignores the >> > recommendation of the "public interest representatives" and takes a >> > radical backward step from the previous law and practice by calling >> > for an even greater restriction on freedom of association. >> > >> > 2. Wage Payment for Full-time Union Officers >> > >> > The new labour law introduces a new provision on the full-time >> > union officers. The Article 24 of the Trade Union and Industrial >> > Relations Adjustment Act states: >> > >> > I. An employee, if stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement >> > or agreed to by the employer, can engage in the work and >> > activities of union on full-time basis without providing labour as >> > required by employment contract. >> > II. The person(s) engaged in union work full-time as specified in the >> > above paragraph ("full-time union staff") shall not receive any >kind >> > of remuneration or wage from the employer for the period of >> > his/her term as full-time union staff. >> > >> > The draft bill, then, goes on to define the practice of "providing wage >> > to a full-time union officer" as an "unfair labour practice" on the >part >> > of the employer (TU&IRRA 81d). >> > >> > The Korean government, in its amendment, introduces a >> > legislative regulation not found in any other country in the world. It >> > runs contrary to the ILO recommendation that employers should >> > provide wage, allowance, and leave to workers representatives at the >> > company level. The new law, in stipulating for a gradual progress >> > towards the total termination of the current practice of wage payment >> > to full-time union officers by the end of year 2001, declares that >> > "trade unions must endeavour to achieve financial independence". >> > The government is "exploiting" the principle of financial >> > independence, turning it into a weapons against the trade union >> > movement. This will become a devastating weapon in the current >> > situation where unions in companies with less than 100 employees >> > make up 63% of all the unions in Korea. The impact of this law will be >> > crippling as the monthly financial resources of most of these unions >> > are less than one million Won. >> > >> > The Korean government's legislative initiative willfully exploits >> > that current enterprise union system. As all 'unit' unions in Korea are >> > enterprise level unions, the trade union movement is unable to >> > accumulate a substantial financial base. Each enterprise union is an >> > integral union with its own president and other full-time officers. >They >> > are in no way identical to "shopstewards" or organisers or officers >> > found in the 'industrial' unions of other countries. There is no >denying >> > that organisers and full-time officers 'employed' by industrial unions >> > should be fully supported by the unions themselves. This principle, >> > however, cannot apply to the specific Korean situation where an >> > individual union at each enterprise has to finance all its activities >from >> > its circumscribed membership dues. The new legislative stipulation, >> > therefore, can only be perceived as an attempt to emasculate the >> > trade union movement before it transforms itself into a powerful >> > industrial structure. >> > >> > 3. Right of Ratification >> > >> > Under the previous law, a union, following its constitution and >> > rules, can put a 'provisional' collective bargaining agreement arrived >> > through negotiations with the employer to a vote of the general >> > meeting of the union membership. This is similar to the 'ratification' >> > procedure that a government may be required to undertake to adopt a >> > binding international agreement or treaty. The previous legislative >> > arrangement does not stipulate a ratification process; nor does it >> > specifically 'outlaw' such a process. The ratification process is a >> > democratic procedure that strengthens the accountability of a union >> > leadership and the democratic participation of the membership in the >> > union's decision making. As such it is a matter that should be left to >> > the constitution and the rules of the individual union. >> > >> > The new law, however, paves the way for an automatic adoption >> > of a legally binding CBA based on the agreement between the >> > employers and a handful of union officers. It says: "the representative >> > of a union has the right to negotiate and adopt a collective bargaining >> > agreement on behalf of the union or the members" (TU&IRAA 29:1). >> > While the new legislation does not enforce such an arrangement, it >> > does introduce a legal basis for a judicial or administrative >> > intervention against a popular rejection of an agreement between the >> > union officer corps and the employer. >> > >> > This points to a worst case scenario of a collusion between the >> > elected union leaders and employers. Such a situation may exist in >> > weak or nascent unions or in situation where 'yellow unionism' is >> > prevalent, which could be said to have been the case in Korea for a >> > long time. The internal decision making procedure such as this, >> > therefore, is a matter that should be left to the members and the >> > organisation itself to decide. It is a matter that can only be decided >by >> > the members themselves by balancing the need for democracy and >> > efficiency as they perceive. > From daga at HK.Super.NET Fri Feb 28 11:01:49 1997 From: daga at HK.Super.NET (daga) Date: Fri, 28 Feb 1997 10:01:49 +0800 (HKT) Subject: [asia-apec 366] "Social Clause" Hearing & parliamentary reports Message-ID: <2.2.16.19970228095508.26e76afa@is1.hk.super.net> Date: 27 Feb 97 10:38:16 EST From: Paul Lim <100710.323@CompuServe.COM> To: asia-hr-alert Subject: [Asia-HR-Alert] "Social Clause" Hearing & parliamentary reports Sender: Owner-Asia-HR-Alert@mail.jca.or.jp X-Sequence: asia-hr-alert 66 Reply-To: Owner-Asia-HR-Alert@mail.jca.or.jp To: THE HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK AND OTHER INTERESTED NETWORKS From: PAUL LIM EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 1. The European Parliament's Sub-Committee on Human Rights will be holding Hearing on the "Social Clause" in June. The Committee is looking for speakers on this subject from Asia. Speakers are also sought for the other continents. If anyone or any organisation in Asia can suggest potential names of speakers, please let me know as soon as possible. I will need a little background of candidates proposed. The hearing is to be organised in a balance with different viewpoints for and against. The position of Asian governments are well-known here and this has to be taken into connsideration. Note that in such a hearing, the Asian embassies will be represented and they can intervene for their own governments or as a group like ASEAN. The date-line unfortunately is in a week's time that is by the 7th March 1996. If there are no suggestions from Asia then Asia could be left out. Now what is the scope of the "social clause" hearing. It could cover child labour, prison labour, forced labour, trade union rights, the whole question of "codes of conduct" to be observed by multinationals, small and medium-sized industries investing Asia. Or you may have a particular view on the "social clause". The final line of the person's speech will be discussed later. At the moment it is trying to find people. Person must be acknowledgeable on the whole debate on "social clause". Please send me your suggestions as soon as possible. 2. The European Parliament is also dealing with reports on the following countries: S. Korea, ASEAN, Vietnam's admission into EU-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia, India and China. These reports are either in view of the process of ratification of agreements with some of these countries or an appraisal of relations with these countries. You are invited to give input into these reports which cover a whole range of issues or facets of the relationship. It covers not just human rights and democracy but the environment, development policy, economic relations, political relations, political dialogue, regional cooperation, security etc.. The contents of any agreement with a third country covers cooperation in many fields including the scientific. So, you welcome to give me information which could be fed into these parliamentary reports. Please do not e-mail me whatever information you have as I still have problems in decoding files to me but fax to +32-2-2849449. Regards to all and yours sincerely, Paul Lim